Jonathan Ashby v The County Court in Sibenik, Croatia

Abuse of process in extradition is a residual jurisdiction exercised only in exceptional circumstances. It requires cogent evidence that the requesting authority has usurped or compromised the statutory extradition regime, together with unfair or unjust prejudice to the requested person. A requesting authority may withdraw a sentence-transfer request before enforcement begins. Prior agreement to transfer a sentence does not make later extradition disproportionate under Article 8 where the requested person failed to use the opportunity to serve the sentence in the United Kingdom. Proportionality is assessed by the court on the evidence as a whole, including the public interest in extradition and the actual hardship caused.

The Appellant appealed against District Judge Cieciora’s decision of 9 February 2024 ordering his extradition to Croatia under a conviction warrant concerning a remaining custodial sentence for drug production and trafficking.

Permission was granted on grounds of abuse of process and incompatibility with Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Appellant relied on the United Kingdom’s January 2020 acceptance that he could serve his sentence here. He argued that the Croatian Judicial Authority had thereby lost the right to seek extradition and that he had a legitimate expectation of serving the sentence in the United Kingdom.

1. Appeal dismissed. The statutory appeal test under sections 27(2) and (3) of the Extradition Act 2003 was not satisfied.
2. The Croatian Judicial Authority was entitled to withdraw its request to transfer the sentence before the Appellant began serving it in the United Kingdom. Article 13 of Council Framework Decision 2008/909/JHA permitted withdrawal before enforcement commenced, and the reasons for withdrawal had been communicated through the Further Information.
3. The circumstances did not establish abuse of process. There was no cogent evidence of bad faith, manipulation, ulterior motive, usurpation of the statutory regime or impairment of its integrity. Any failure to notify the Croatian Judicial Authority directly of the January 2020 decision did not make the arrest warrant abusive. The Appellant had not begun serving the sentence and had used the transfer arrangements to delay or avoid doing so.
4. The test in Belbin v The Regional Court of Lille, France [2015] EWHC 149 (Admin) was satisfied against the Appellant. Extradition was not unfair or unjust and did not cause unfair prejudice in the United Kingdom or Croatia. The bad-faith paradigm identified in Aleksynas & Others v Republic of Lithuania [2014] EWHC 437 (Admin) was absent.
5. The Article 8 challenge also failed. The District Judge was required to assess proportionality by reference to the evidence as a whole, rather than treating the earlier transfer decision as decisive. The Appellant had been given an opportunity to serve his sentence here but had not taken it. His resulting expectation was no longer reasonable, and the hardship to him and his family was not unusual. Extradition therefore remained proportionate.

The appeal was dismissed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Appeal against the extradition order was dismissed.
• Westminster Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Cieciora ordered extradition on 9 February 2024.