Rory Walsh, R (on the application of) v Horsham District Council

When a local planning committee grants permission contrary to officers’ recommendation, its reasons must be intelligible and adequate on the principal controversial issues. They may be read with the officers’ reports and need not repeat matters already set out there. Members may reach a different planning judgment from officers and are not required to give reasons for their reasons.

Under paragraph 186(c) of the National Planning Policy Framework, “wholly exceptional reasons” and a suitable compensation strategy are separate and cumulative requirements. Footnote 67 gives illustrations, rather than an exhaustive test or standard. Compensation cannot justify the loss or deterioration of an irreplaceable habitat. Planning judgment and the weighing of benefits are matters for the local authority, subject to the high threshold for irrationality.

The claimant sought judicial review of the Council’s decision to grant planning permission for the conversion of an existing grass football pitch to an artificial 3G surface, with associated paths, fencing, floodlighting and storage facilities.

The principal issue was whether the Council had lawfully concluded that there were “wholly exceptional reasons” under paragraph 186(c) of the National Planning Policy Framework to justify the potential deterioration or loss of a veteran ash tree. The claimant also challenged the adequacy of conditions and the rationality of the decision. Following a Town and Country Planning Act 1990 section 106 agreement, the conditions issue became academic.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. The Committee’s reasons were intelligible and adequate when read with the published officers’ reports. Applying R (CPRE Kent) v Dover DC [2017] UKSC 79 and South Bucks District Council v Porter (No. 2) [2004] 1 WLR 1953, a local planning authority’s reasons need not be treated as a standalone inspector’s decision. They may be limited to the points of difference from the officers’ recommendation.

2. The Committee was entitled to accept the officers’ factual and financial analysis, while reaching a different planning judgment on whether the benefits amounted to wholly exceptional reasons. It was not required to restate the benefits, financial evidence or policy analysis already contained in the reports, nor to give reasons for its reasons. The approach was consistent with R (Tesco Stores Ltd) v Reigate and Banstead BC [2024] EWHC 2327 (Admin). R (Cross) v Cornwall Council [2021] EWHC 1323 (Admin) was distinguishable because the reasons recorded there were inaccurate and inadequate.

3. Footnote 67 to paragraph 186(c) is illustrative guidance. It does not form part of the policy test, impose a requirement that the development be nationally significant infrastructure, or exhaust the circumstances capable of constituting wholly exceptional reasons. The Committee was entitled to regard the proposed facilities as significant new infrastructure benefiting the local community.

4. The requirements of wholly exceptional reasons and a suitable compensation strategy are separate and cumulative. Compensation must not form part of the justification for loss or deterioration of the veteran tree. The Committee’s resolution, read with the officers’ advice, sufficiently separated those matters. The principle in Juden v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2021] EWHC 1368 (Admin) was satisfied.

5. Ground 3 dismissed. The rationality challenge failed. Planning judgment and the weighing of competing public and private interests were matters for the Committee, not the court. The conclusion that the proposal disclosed wholly exceptional reasons fell within the range of reasonable responses open to it. The judicial review claim was dismissed.