Samira Addou v Sidali Bennabi

In family contempt proceedings, imprisonment is not automatic, but may be appropriate where repeated and wilful breaches of child-return orders are grave and continuing. The court must sentence having regard to the objectives of marking disapproval and securing future compliance. It must assess the seriousness of the breaches, the welfare and family context, mitigation, any parallel sanctions, and the available maximum sentence. Suspension is available in a wider range of cases than in criminal proceedings, but should not be ordered where the contemnor shows no realistic prospect of compliance. A sentence should be fixed without treating suspension as reducing its length, and time already spent in custody should be credited.

The applicant sought committal of the respondent for contempt arising from three breaches of orders requiring him to return the child, Z, to England and Wales. The breaches concerned orders dated 11 May 2023, 29 March 2024 and 23 September 2024. The court found all three breaches proved and heard mitigation concerning Z’s welfare, the respondent’s financial position and health. The central issues were the appropriate custodial sentence, whether it should be suspended, and how prior custody and sequestration should affect sentence.

1. Contempt proved and sentence imposed. The respondent was in breach of three orders requiring the return of Z to England and Wales. Each breach warranted a sentence of imprisonment towards the upper end of the scale. The court imposed 16 months for each breach, concurrent, and reduced the term to 13 months to reflect 32 days already spent in custody.
2. Sentencing principles. Applying the family-law principles identified in Hale v Tanner [2000] EWCA Civ 5570, imprisonment is not automatic on a first breach. The court must consider the purposes of expressing disapproval and securing future compliance, the seriousness of the conduct, the two-year maximum, the family context, available alternatives, and any parallel proceedings or sanctions. The length of imprisonment must be determined independently of whether execution is suspended.
3. Mitigation and proportionality. The child’s circumstances, the respondent’s financial consequences and health issues were considered. The repeated, wilful breaches, the respondent’s lack of remorse or insight, his disregard of the court process, and the prolonged separation of mother and child made the conduct particularly grave. The sequestration order was treated as an existing punitive measure and therefore moderated the sentence slightly.
4. Suspension. Although suspension is available in a wider range of circumstances than in criminal cases, immediate custody was necessary. The respondent had expressly stated that he would not return Z and had given no indication that a suspended sentence would secure compliance. The concurrent 13-month sentences were activated immediately. The respondent remained able to apply to purge his contempt if he procured Z’s return, and such an application would likely receive favourable consideration if return occurred promptly.