Birmingham City Council v Connor Hill & Ors

In civil contempt proceedings, the claimant must prove the breach beyond reasonable doubt. Sentencing should prioritise securing future compliance, followed by punishment and rehabilitation. The court may use the Civil Justice Council’s sentencing matrix for contempt involving antisocial behaviour as an analogy outside the statutory scheme, where the conduct is comparable. Culpability and harm must be assessed separately, including actual harm, intended harm and the risk created by the breach. A first deliberate breach involving serious risk to the public may justify custody, but mitigation and early admissions may substantially reduce the sentence. Suspension is ordinarily the first means of promoting compliance. Civil legal-aid costs protection does not extend to criminal legal aid for contempt proceedings.

The claimant local authority brought contempt applications against three defendants who admitted breaching an interim injunction prohibiting participation in street cruises in Birmingham. The injunction had been granted and subsequently amended in earlier proceedings, and remained in force pending the final hearing.

The defendants admitted driving at excessive speed and racing or exchanging places with other vehicles in busy urban areas. The court therefore addressed the appropriate sentence, the effect of their admissions and mitigation, and the claimant’s application for costs.

1. Contempt proved. Although civil in nature, the proceedings required proof beyond reasonable doubt. The defendants’ written admissions, together with the claimant’s written and video evidence, established the breaches.
2. Sentencing principles. The court followed the objectives identified in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631: securing future compliance, punishment and rehabilitation, in that order. It adopted the approach summarised by the Supreme Court in Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15, as endorsed in Breen v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 1405.
3. Guideline analogy. In accordance with Lovett, the court used the sentencing matrix in Annex 1 to the Civil Justice Council’s July 2020 report concerning contempt arising from orders under the Antisocial Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014. The use of that analogy outside the 2014 Act, for comparable antisocial conduct, had been endorsed in Birmingham City Council v Lloyd [2023] EWCA Civ 1355.
4. Culpability and harm. Each breach was deliberate but a first breach falling within culpability category B, rather than the very serious or persistent breaches reserved for category A. The harm was category 2, at the upper end of medium, because racing at speeds approaching twice the limit in urban areas created a significant risk of serious harm to the defendants, pedestrians and other road users.
5. Sentence. The starting point was one month’s imprisonment. In light of the defendants’ good character, remorse, employment and family responsibilities, the court imposed 35 days’ imprisonment in each case. One-third credit for admissions reduced each sentence to 23 days. Each sentence was suspended for 12 months, conditional on compliance with the injunction as currently or subsequently amended.
6. Costs. The claimant was the successful party and there was no reason to depart from the general rule in CPR 44.22(2). Each defendant was ordered to pay £830, comprising the £255 issue fee and £575 towards counsel’s fees, by instalments of £100 per month. Following Secretary of State for Transport v Cuciurean [2022] EWCA Civ 661, the costs protection in section 26 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 did not apply because the defendants received criminal legal aid for contempt proceedings.