Lloyds Bank PLC v Trevor Mealham & Anor

An application to set aside an order dispensing with notice of eviction must address the procedural order actually made. It cannot reopen an unchallenged possession order or issues already finally determined. Under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r.23.10 provides a procedural route to challenge an order made without notice, but a proper ground remains necessary. In assessing an extended civil restraint order, the court evaluates the party’s overall conduct. It does not simply count totally without merit findings. Persistent totally without merit applications, harassment, assaults, disruptive conduct and an apparent intention to continue a campaign may justify an extended order where a limited restraint would be inadequate.

The Bank obtained a possession order against the defendants in 2022 following unsuccessful allegations of fraud and an unsuccessful application for permission to appeal. A later application to suspend enforcement was refused, and the proceedings were transferred to the High Court for enforcement.

A Deputy Master then dispensed with the requirement to give notice of eviction before issuing the writ of possession. The defendants applied under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r.23.10 to set that order aside. The court also had to consider, of its own motion, whether Mr Mealham’s repeated totally without merit applications and wider conduct warranted an extended civil restraint order.

1. Application to set aside. The application was construed as an application under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r.23.10 to set aside the order dispensing with notice of eviction. It could not properly reopen the possession order or the refusal to stay it, because those matters had already been decided and were no longer open to challenge before this court.
2. Nature of the order. Under Civil Procedure Rules 1998, r.83, a writ of possession may issue where there is a regular possession order which has not been stayed. Rule 83.8A requires notice of a proposed eviction unless the requirement is dispensed with. The only judicial decision involved in the order under challenge was the dispensing of that notice requirement.
3. The discretion under r.23.10 is procedural. The fact that an order was made without notice supplies a route to apply to set it aside, but does not itself establish a proper ground. The order was justified by the unchallengeable possession order, credible evidence of previous assaults, and evidence linking Mr Mealham with organised attempts to obstruct lawful evictions. The application was dismissed and certified totally without merit under r.23.12.
4. Extended civil restraint order. Paragraph 3.1 of Practice Direction 3C permits an extended civil restraint order where a party persistently issues claims or makes applications which are totally without merit. “Persistently” requires at least three such occasions, but the court must evaluate the party’s overall conduct, following Sartipy v Tigris Industries Inc [2019] 1 WLR 5892. Here there were six findings on five occasions, together with harassment, serious assaults, disruptive courtroom conduct and continuing reliance on rejected allegations. A limited order would not suffice. An extended civil restraint order was imposed for three years.
5. Permission to appeal against both the dismissal of the application and the extended order was refused, without preventing an application to the Court of Appeal for permission.

First-instance decision. The judgment records earlier County Court orders and refusals of permission to appeal, but this court determined an enforcement application and made an extended civil restraint order.