Secretary of State for the Home Department v KIB

An anonymity order in TPIM proceedings requires a clear legal basis and must be strictly necessary. The statutory scheme and Civil Procedure Rules 1998 permit an application for anonymity, but do not create a freestanding power to prohibit a TPIM subject from publishing their own identity or address. The court’s power is principally derived from section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, read with section 37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. The court must balance Convention rights, including privacy and freedom of expression, and respect the autonomy of an adult with capacity. The modified overriding objective in CPR 80.2(2) regulates disclosure in TPIM proceedings; it does not generally restrain information already known to the proposed respondent.

The Secretary of State applied without notice, before substantive TPIM proceedings had begun, for an order anonymising KIB and prohibiting publication of information that might identify KIB as a person subject to, or being considered for, a TPIM. The proposed order would also prohibit publication of KIB’s town or address and would bind KIB and the world.

The application relied on the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, CPR 80.15, the court’s human-rights jurisdiction and its inherent jurisdiction. The central issues were whether the court had power to make the proposed order and whether the order was justified and proportionate.

1. Application refused. The proposed order involved a substantial derogation from open justice, restrained the respondent’s freedom of expression, bound the respondent without an opportunity to make representations, and operated as an injunction enforceable by contempt.
2. The power to make anonymity orders derives from section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, read with section 37(1) of the Senior Courts Act 1981. Its exercise requires clear and cogent evidence of strict necessity and a careful balance between Convention rights, particularly articles 8 and 10.
3. The statutory TPIM scheme authorises rules concerning applications for anonymity and orders requiring anonymity. CPR 80.15 assumes an existing power to grant such relief but does not itself create a separate, general power based on unspecified criteria. The statutory scheme therefore does not authorise an order solely because anonymity would make administration of a TPIM easier.
4. CPR 80.2(2), which modifies the overriding objective to prevent disclosure contrary to the public interest, concerns information disclosed in the TPIM proceedings. It does not provide a freestanding power to prevent the respondent from publicising their own identity or address.
5. An adult with mental capacity has personal autonomy under article 8, including a choice whether to publish information about themselves. If the respondent, once informed, chose not to seek anonymity, restraining that choice would be a disproportionate interference with article 10. The fact that implementation might become more difficult, expensive or resource-intensive was insufficient.
6. Anonymity orders made when substantive TPIM proceedings are commenced may be justifiable to protect the respondent’s Convention rights, but each case requires individual justification. The proposed order went beyond protecting identity in the proceedings by restricting publication of the respondent’s address independently of the TPIM.