Dean Hallam, R (on the application of) v The Secretary of State for Justice

When rejecting a Parole Board recommendation that an indeterminate-sentence prisoner be transferred to open conditions, the Secretary of State must give the recommendation appropriate weight and provide intelligible reasons for departing from it. The weight required depends on the issue, the nature of the hearing, the Board’s findings and its risk assessment. The Secretary of State may reach an independent evaluative judgment on essentiality and public confidence, while respecting the Board’s particular advantage in fact-finding. The decision-maker may consider the full evidential history, including earlier expert assessments, and is not confined to the views expressed at the oral hearing. A decision is lawful where, read as a whole, it engages with the Board’s reasoning, acknowledges favourable evidence and explains the contrary conclusion.

The claimant, a post-tariff prisoner serving an imprisonment for public protection sentence, challenged the Secretary of State’s refusal to accept the Parole Board’s recommendation that he return to open conditions. The recommendation followed his return to closed conditions after breaches of restrictions concerning contact with children and possession of offence-paralleling material.

The claimant argued that the decision was irrational or inadequately reasoned because a move to open conditions was not essential and because it would undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system. The central issues were the weight owed to the Parole Board’s recommendation, the scope of the Secretary of State’s evaluative judgment, and the adequacy of the reasons given.

1. The claim was dismissed. Neither ground of challenge was made out.
2. The court adopted the principles summarised in R (Green) v Secretary of State for Justice (No 2) [2023] EWHC 1211 (Admin). The Secretary of State must accord weight to the Parole Board’s recommendation. Where the Board has a particular advantage, such as fact-finding, clear, cogent and convincing reasons are required for departure. On evaluative matters such as risk, the Secretary of State must show appropriate respect and give reasons, but may be challenged only on conventional public law grounds.
3. The Secretary of State lawfully considered the wider psychological evidence. It was permissible to take account of the January 2022 joint report, despite the later oral evidence. One expert supported transfer, while the prison psychologist expressed views but made no recommendation. That position was capable of raising a legitimate issue for further consideration. The Secretary of State was entitled to assess the continuum of expert evidence and reach a different conclusion on essentiality.
4. The public-confidence conclusion was also lawful. The decision-maker was particularly well placed to assess that issue because of the broader overview available from considering a cohort of offenders. The serious index offending, the return to closed conditions following offence-paralleling behaviour, continuing concerns about family dynamics and openness with professionals, and the remaining risk of serious harm provided an intelligible basis for the conclusion.
5. The decision letter, read as a whole, engaged sufficiently with the Parole Board’s report, acknowledged positive progress and explained why the recommendation was not accepted. In any event, even if Ground 1 had succeeded, relief would have been refused under section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981, since the outcome would not have differed.