Patrick David Wigglesworth v Vanessa Kim Beetson

A contract for the sale of land made before 1989 need only be evidenced in writing, and part performance may satisfy the equitable exception. Specific performance, however, is limited to the land and rights actually agreed.

Proprietary estoppel requires a sufficiently clear assurance, reliance causing detriment, and unconscionability. Adverse possession requires both factual possession and an intention to possess. Possession with the owner’s consent, or shared use inconsistent with exclusive possession, is not adverse.

The rule in Browne v Dunn is a rule of fairness concerning challenges to evidence. It does not invariably require a court to accept evidence which was not challenged in cross-examination, particularly where the evidence is incredible or its rejection would make no difference.

The claimant sought specific performance of an alleged 1982 agreement with Timothy Beetson for the sale of a 120-foot by 60-foot plot at Cotswold Hill Quarry, together with access rights. He also claimed the larger area by proprietary estoppel and adverse possession, and claimed damages for alleged trespass to land and goods.

The defendant, Mr Beetson’s widow and executrix, admitted that the claimant had acquired the 60-foot by 30-foot workshop footprint and shared use of an existing right of way, but denied the larger claim. The central issues were the extent of the 1982 agreement, the effect of an annotated plan and an unsigned written contract, whether the alternative proprietary claims succeeded, and whether removal of stored goods constituted trespass.

1. Disposition. The claim succeeded only in relation to the 30-foot by 60-foot workshop footprint and the shared use of the right of way down the western fork. It was otherwise dismissed.
2. Contract. The applicable formalities were those in section 40 of the Law of Property Act 1925, rather than section 2 of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989. The parties had made a specifically enforceable agreement, supported by payment and part performance, but the evidence established only a sale of the workshop footprint and a grant of shared use of the right of way. The alleged sale of the larger plot and of the right of way itself was not proved.
3. Evidence. The claimant’s evidence concerning the larger annotations on the plan was rejected. Applying the flexible fairness principle in Browne v Dunn, as explained in Chen v Ng and Griffiths v TUI UK Ltd, the judge was not bound to accept evidence which had not been expressly challenged where it was so incredible that an opportunity to explain would have made no difference.
4. Proprietary estoppel. There was no sufficiently clear promise or assurance that the claimant would receive the larger plot. In any event, there was no proven detrimental reliance making it unconscionable for the estate to resile.
5. Adverse possession. The workshop footprint was occupied under the specifically enforceable contract and constructive trust. The excess land was not possessed exclusively: it was also used by Mr Beetson and others, goods were moved when requested, and the claimant’s use was permitted. The statutory test was therefore unsatisfied.
6. Easement of necessity. If the larger sale had been proved, an easement would have been implied because disposal of the claimed land and access would otherwise have rendered the quarry unusable for its intended purpose. A pedestrian footpath was insufficient for a quarry requiring vehicular access.
7. Trespass. The defendant was entitled to remove goods stored on her land after repeated requests for their removal. No actionable trespass was established. In any event, absent proof of actual damage, only nominal damages would have been recoverable.