Martin Richard Walsh v Melanie Trudy Richardson & Anor

An interim declaration is inappropriate where the relief sought would finally determine the parties’ substantive rights. A party seeking summary determination must use the summary judgment jurisdiction under Part 24, which requires proof that the opposing party has no realistic prospect of success. Interim relief cannot be used to bypass the safeguards of summary judgment where material disputes of fact or law require a trial. Recusal applications require an actual conflict or a real basis upon which a fair-minded and properly informed observer would consider the judge incapable of hearing the case fairly. Unsubstantiated allegations of bias or corruption do not satisfy that test and may justify certification as totally without merit.

The claimant sought relief concerning a property, relying on a charging order and a later assignment. The second defendant, who had occupied the property for more than 12 years, claimed an interest arising from an alleged 2011 arrangement with the registered owner. The claimant made two applications under rule 25.1(1)(b) of the CPR for interim declarations that the second defendant had no interest and that his alleged interest was barred or void under section 284 of the Insolvency Act 1986.

The claimant also applied for the judge’s recusal, alleging judicial corruption and a connection with separate proceedings. The central issues were whether recusal was justified, whether interim declarations could determine the disputed rights, and whether the existing trial directions should be set aside.

1. Recusal. The judge had no actual conflict. A fair-minded and properly informed observer would not consider him incapable of hearing the case fairly. The allegations of corruption and judicial cover-up had no evidential basis. The recusal application was totally without merit and was dismissed.
2. Interim declarations. The claimant’s applications sought final and determinative answers to the parties’ substantive rights, rather than genuinely provisional relief. Following the approach in Lenovo Group Limited v InterDigital Technology Corporation [2024] EWHC 596 (Ch), N v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2017] EWCA 253 and The British Airline Pilots’ Association v British Airways CityFlyer Limited [2018] EWHC 1889 (QB), the court held that such relief was inappropriate under rule 25.1(1)(b).
3. The proper procedure for summary determination without a trial was summary judgment under Part 24. That jurisdiction requires the applicant to show that the opposing party has no realistic prospect of success. It is unsuitable where disputed facts require evidence and cross-examination.
4. There were substantial disputes concerning the alleged assignment, the effect of the bankruptcy and section 284 of the Insolvency Act 1986, and the alleged 2011 arrangement. Those matters required determination at trial. There had been no material change justifying variation of the case-management directions.
5. The applications were dismissed. The second defendant was awarded £8,000 costs on summary assessment, payable by the claimant. Indemnity costs were refused.