Natasha Carr v Chief Constable of Kent Constabulary

On an application for permission to appeal, a trial judge sitting with a jury may determine an issue where the evidence permits only one reasonable inference. This includes drawing inferences from undisputed evidence concerning consent, the lawfulness of police presence, reasonable suspicion and the necessity of arrest. A late amendment to a defence may properly be allowed as case management where the evidence already addresses the issue and refusal would produce an artificial trial. Permission should proceed where there is an arguable issue as to the existence of a power to detain and whether detention was necessary and proportionate.

The claimant sought permission to appeal from a County Court judgment dismissing claims for trespass, false imprisonment, assault and battery, and misfeasance in public office arising from police incidents in June and November 2015 and January 2016.

The County Court judge sat with a jury but withdrew the material issues from it. Cotter J refused permission on the papers. The renewed application concerned nine grounds, including late amendment and consent, the lawfulness of police entry and continued presence, the first two arrests, misfeasance, and the claimant’s detention on 4 January 2016.

1. Permission refused on grounds 1–6. The County Court judge gave adequate reasons and was entitled to permit the defendant to amend its defence to plead consent after the evidence had closed. The evidence already addressed consent, and the claimant suffered no irremediable prejudice.
2. The judge was entitled to conclude that the evidence supported only the inference that the officers initially entered with the claimant’s consent. A judge sitting with a jury may decide an issue where no reasonable jury, properly directed, could reach a different conclusion.
3. The judge was also entitled to determine that the officers had lawful grounds to remain after consent was withdrawn, including an actual or imminent breach of the peace and the common law duty, or Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 section 17(1)(e), to protect the claimant’s child. The reasons concerning trespass, child neglect and misfeasance disclosed no arguable error.
4. The judge was entitled to find that the second arrest was necessary. The evidence concerning alleged harassment and threats, the need to prevent the suspects coordinating their accounts, and the need to obtain evidence in interview provided a sound basis for that conclusion.
5. Permission granted on grounds 7–9. The claimant’s detention on 4 January 2016 for three and a half hours raised arguable issues as to whether there was a power to detain and, in any event, whether the detention was necessary and proportionate. Those grounds were discrete and had a realistic prospect of success.

The application was therefore granted in respect of grounds 7–9 and refused in respect of grounds 1–6.

• High Court (King’s Bench Division): Permission to appeal granted on grounds 7–9 and refused on grounds 1–6.
• County Court at Canterbury: Her Honour Judge Brown dismissed the claimant’s claims after a nine-day trial.
• Permission decision: Cotter J refused permission to appeal on the papers on 13 June 2024.