R v Anjum

Under the graduated-fee scheme, the question is whether the defendant faced more than one legally distinct case, not how many indictment documents were uploaded or stayed. Changes to counts, prosecutorial strategy and Digital Case Management formalities do not by themselves create separate cases. The court must identify a real distinction between the indictments, such as severance requiring separate trials or an equivalent separation. Where successive indictments concern a connected course of conduct and later consolidate existing counts, they ordinarily remain one case. A cracked-trial fee is payable only for a case that does not proceed to trial; it is an alternative to a trial fee, not an addition to one.

The appellant represented the defendant in terrorism-related Crown Court proceedings funded under a representation order. Three successive indictment documents were used. The defendant was tried on the first, retried on the second after the first jury failed to reach a verdict, and later pleaded guilty to selected counts on the third. The earlier indictments were then formally stayed.

The Legal Aid Agency’s Determining Officer concluded that there had been only one case for the purposes of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013. The appellant argued that the successive indictments and trials entitled him to additional cracked-trial fees. The appeal concerned whether the indictment changes represented more than one case under Schedule 1.

1. Appeal dismissed. Only one case existed against the defendant for the purposes of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013.

2. Schedule 1 defines a case by reference to proceedings against one assisted person on one or more counts of a single indictment. A cracked-trial fee is payable only where the case does not proceed to trial. It is an alternative to a trial fee, not an additional fee.

3. The court adopted the approach in R v Shabir & Khan and R v Thomas. There must be a real distinction between the relevant indictments, sufficient to show that there was more than one case as a matter of law. The mere addition or removal of counts, changes in prosecution tactics, fresh document identifiers, or the formal staying of an earlier indictment because of the Digital Case Management system do not suffice.

4. The second indictment resulted from the joinder of a possession indictment to the first indictment, together with the temporary removal of dissemination counts. The second trial was therefore a retrial rather than a fresh trial on a new case.

5. The third indictment consolidated the existing counts and included counts to which the defendant or his co-defendant had already pleaded or been convicted. The defendant’s lack of re-arraignment on certain counts, and the formal stays of the earlier indictments, were evidence of administrative consolidation and housekeeping. The added count did not create a separate case.

6. Although the successive indictments varied, the counts arose from a connected course of conduct and the principal terrorism count remained constant. The procedural and administrative features relied upon by the appellant did not establish the required legal distinction. The appeal was dismissed.

1. High Court (Senior Courts Costs Office): appeal under regulation 29 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013 dismissed. The court upheld the Determining Officer’s conclusion that there was only one case.