Hart District Council v Helen Freeman & Anor

Sanction for contempt by breach of an injunction is analogous to sentencing, but criminal sentencing guidance is not applied mechanically. The court should assess culpability and actual or potential harm, impose the least severe sanction necessary to meet the purposes of punishment, rehabilitation and future compliance, and cross the custodial threshold before ordering custody. A custodial term may then be suspended where immediate imprisonment is unnecessary, including having regard to welfare and mitigation. Adapted tables prepared for other types of injunction should not be transplanted without considering the different statutory and factual context.

The claimant, a planning authority, applied to commit the defendants for breach of an injunction governing residential occupation of a twin-unit caravan. Following a trial, the court found both defendants in breach during several periods between 4 January and 26 March 2024. The hearing concerned sanction only.

The court considered the available sanctions, the defendants’ culpability and the harm caused, their mitigation, financial and mental-health circumstances, family responsibilities, and their stated intention to comply in future. The central issue was the appropriate sanction for the established breaches, including whether custody was necessary and whether any custodial term should be suspended.

1. Sanctioning approach. The court was determining sanctions for breach of an injunction, not imposing sentence for criminal offences. The approach is analogous to Crown Court sentencing. Seriousness is assessed by culpability and actual or potential harm, and the least severe sanction commensurate with the objectives of punishment, rehabilitation and securing future compliance should be imposed. Committal should not be ordered unless the custodial threshold is crossed.
2. Use of guidance. Crown Court Sentencing Council guidelines may provide assistance, but cannot be followed slavishly because they do not apply directly, the maximum committal period is two years, and the context of a planning injunction differs from breach of a criminal behaviour order or anti-social behaviour injunction. The adapted table discussed in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631 was not transplanted into this case.
3. Assessment of these breaches. Breach of an injunction is inherently serious because it defies the court and damages confidence in the justice system. Here, the breaches also undermined planning objectives and local amenity, although the harm was reversible and did not involve threats of personal harm. The conduct was not accidental: it resulted from a settled pattern of use, although the defendants felt driven by family, business and financial circumstances. The breaches were towards the lower end of the spectrum, but were not isolated or wholly unintentional. The custodial threshold was therefore crossed.
4. Sanction and suspension. A custodial term of six weeks was appropriate for each defendant. Immediate custody was unnecessary for punishment or future compliance, particularly because the defendants had taken steps to comply and suspended custody provided a powerful incentive. The welfare of their two young children, together with their financial and mental-health circumstances, strongly supported suspension.
5. The court imposed six-week committal orders against both defendants, suspended for 12 months. Any further breach of the injunction during that period could lead to activation of the relevant order. The court did not impose a fine.