The Julie Richardson Limited & Anor v Oxfordshire County Council

A care provider may have an arguable restitutionary claim against a local authority where it has supplied care and accommodation meeting needs for which the authority owed statutory duties. The claim is not necessarily an impermissible attempt to challenge a public-law decision through private-law proceedings. The exclusivity principle in O’Reilly v Mackman does not apply where private-law rights are involved and insisting on judicial review would cause injustice. At the strike-out or summary-judgment stage, a proposed amendment should be permitted where the claim is arguable, coherent, properly particularised and supported by an evidential basis. The enrichment may arise from the provider discharging a liability which, absent the authority’s failure to perform its statutory duty, would have been borne by the authority.

Two care-home companies claimed payment from Oxfordshire County Council for care and accommodation supplied to two residents after private funding had been exhausted or ceased. They alleged that the Council owed statutory duties under the Care Act 2014, that the homes had fulfilled those duties, and that the Council had been unjustly enriched.

The Council applied to strike out the claims or obtain summary judgment. The claimants sought permission to amend their pleadings to advance claims in restitution, unjust enrichment and estoppel. The central issues were whether such claims were arguable and whether the public-law nature of the Council’s duties required the claimants to proceed by judicial review.

1. Applications dismissed. Permission was granted to amend the pleadings to include unjust enrichment and estoppel. The applications to strike out and for summary judgment were dismissed.
2. Under sections 9 and 13 of the Care Act 2014, the Council had duties to assess the residents’ needs, determine eligibility, consider how eligible needs should be met, and address ordinary residence. The residents met the eligibility criteria, wished their needs to be met, and were ordinarily resident in the Council’s area.
3. Section 18 imposed a duty to meet eligible needs where the statutory conditions were satisfied. Section 14 conferred a power to charge, but on the pleaded facts the residents had no funds during the periods for which payment was claimed. The care homes had directly provided the care and accommodation, thereby covering the shortfall.
4. The claim was strongly arguable in restitution. Following the reasoning considered in Richards v Worcestershire CC, South Worcestershire Clinical Commissioning Groups and Surrey County Council v NHS Lincolnshire Clinical Commissioning Group, a defendant may be enriched where the claimant discharges a liability which, absent the defendant’s unlawful failure, would have been owed by the defendant. The Council was arguably enriched by the care homes’ performance of duties owed by the Council to the residents.
5. The exclusivity principle in O’Reilly v Mackman did not require the claim to be brought by judicial review. Although the alleged unjust factor was rooted in public law, the asserted right to restitution was a private-law right. It would cause injustice to require the care homes to use judicial review procedure where they claimed recompense for services supplied at their own expense.
6. The proposed amendments were arguable, carried sufficient conviction, were coherent and properly particularised, and had an evidential basis, applying the approach summarised in Pearce v East and North Hertfordshire NHS Trust and the authorities there identified. The estoppel claim was weaker but had sufficient prospects of success to be allowed.