A v R Local Authority & Anor

An adoption order may be set aside only in highly exceptional circumstances, particularly where there has been a fundamental procedural irregularity. The jurisdiction does not provide a route to reopen welfare decisions or challenge the merits of earlier judgments. Apparent bias is assessed by asking whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of an unfair trial. Professional involvement in a child-welfare charity, without more, will not ordinarily satisfy that test. Permission for a post-adoption contact application may be refused where the proposed application risks disrupting the child’s life and causing harm. That risk may outweigh the benefit of satisfying curiosity about biological heritage.

Ms A, the birth mother of two adopted children, applied to set aside or revoke their adoption orders and sought permission to apply for post-adoption contact. Earlier care, placement for adoption and adoption orders had been made, and previous appeals and applications concerning those orders had failed.

The set-aside application relied on alleged procedural unfairness, bias, fraud, racism, inadequate consideration of legislation and welfare matters, and conflicts involving judges and an expert witness. The contact applications were opposed by both local authorities on the basis that further litigation and Ms A’s stated views about adoption posed a risk of harm to the children. The issues were whether the adoption orders could be reopened and whether permission for contact applications should be granted.

1. Set-aside application dismissed. The court accepted the legal framework identified in AX v BX [2021] EWHC 1121 and X v Y [2024] EWHC 1059. The jurisdiction to revoke or set aside an adoption order is confined to highly exceptional and particular circumstances, including fundamental procedural irregularity. It does not extend to reopening welfare decisions or substituting a later assessment of the child’s interests.
2. The complaints about duress, social engineering, trafficking, racism, expert evidence, sibling separation and statutory support did not establish grounds for setting aside the orders. The court was not an appellate forum for reconsidering the earlier judgments. The evidence showed that the children’s welfare and the available support had been considered at the time.
3. The alleged conflict involving judges, an expert and a charity did not establish apparent bias. Applying the approach identified in H (A Child: Recusal) [2003] EWCA Civ 860, the relevant question was whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of an unfair trial. The charity’s professional and training role did not justify that conclusion. R v Bow Street Magistrate ex parte Pinochet (No. 2) [2000] 1 AC 119 did not support so broad an inference.
4. Permission for post-adoption contact applications refused. Under section 51A(5)(a) of the Adoption and Children Act 2002, the court considered the risk that an application would disrupt the children’s lives and cause harm. Ms A’s continuing rejection of the adoptions, litigation history and statements that adopters kill children demonstrated a substantial risk. That risk outweighed any benefit from satisfying the children’s curiosity about their biological heritage.
5. Existing letter-box contact was not prohibited, but the court urged that messages should be reviewed before being passed to the children. The two contact applications were certified as totally without merit.

The judgment describes earlier appeals against the care, placement and adoption proceedings as dismissed. A later application to revoke the adoption orders was dismissed by HHJ Singleton KC, and permission to appeal was refused. This court dismissed the fresh set-aside application and refused permission for post-adoption contact applications.