R v Danson

For special preparation under Schedule 1 to the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, the relevant question is the reasonable time required to consider prosecution evidence exceeding the applicable page cap. The assessment must reflect the work actually and efficiently undertaken. It should not be based on a hypothetical exercise in which counsel reproduces work already performed by an expert. Electronic prosecution evidence may remain relevant evidence for this purpose when an expert has distilled it into organised schedules. A supporting worklog should be considered where it reliably records the evidence reviewed. A minutes-per-page calculation may provide a useful cross-check, but the claim is not governed by a fixed time per page.

The appellant represented the defendant in complex Crown Court proceedings involving alleged conspiracies to transfer prohibited weapons and supply Class A drugs. The prosecution served 28,501 non-electronic pages and extensive electronic material, including telephone data and more than 500 hours of covert monitoring.

The appellant claimed 396 hours for special preparation. The Determining Officer ultimately authorised 236 hours, treating schedules prepared by a communications expert from the electronic evidence as defence-generated material and declining to rely on the appellant’s worklog. The appellant appealed under regulation 29. The central issue was whether work reviewing those schedules constituted consideration of served prosecution evidence and whether the worklog should inform the assessment.

1. The appeal was allowed in full. The additional payment claimed was to be made, together with £450 exclusive of VAT for costs and the £100 appeal fee.
2. Under paragraph 1 of Schedule 1 to the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013, prosecution evidence includes documents served electronically, subject to the treatment of documentary or pictorial exhibits which had never existed in paper form. The relevant inquiry is substantive rather than dependent on the physical form in which the advocate reviews the material.
3. The Determining Officer’s distinction between the raw electronic data served by the prosecution and the expert’s schedules was more hypothetical than real. The schedules were a distilled and better-organised version of the same served data, with irrelevant metadata removed. Treating them as wholly separate defence-generated material imposed an over-literal interpretation on the Regulations.
4. The assessment of special preparation under paragraph 17 must concern time reasonably spent. It should take account of the efficient method actually used by counsel. An assessment based on the time that might have been spent replicating an expert’s editorial work was inappropriate.
5. The appellant’s worklog recorded the evidence considered on a day-by-day basis and provided firm support for the claim. Although the entries were recorded in whole hours and were broadly expressed, they were relevant evidence which the Determining Officer should have considered.
6. A minutes-per-page calculation is not the governing measure, but may provide a useful cross-check. On the facts, slightly over one minute per page for the distilled electronic material was not unreasonable, particularly as no additional allowance was claimed for the excess non-electronic evidence.

• Senior Courts Costs Office: The Determining Officer authorised 236 hours of special preparation after successive determinations. The appellant appealed under regulation 29 of the Criminal Legal Aid (Remuneration) Regulations 2013.
• High Court (Senior Court Costs Office): The appeal was allowed in full and the appropriate additional payment, appeal costs and appeal fee were ordered.