The Traveller Movement, R (on the application of) v Chair of the UK COVID-19 Inquiry

When an inquiry chair decides whether to fund legal representation, the statutory discretion must be exercised fairly and with regard to avoiding unnecessary public expenditure. “Substantial body” is an imprecise term requiring a broad, high-level assessment of the body’s size and resources. The decision-maker need not examine each funding stream or identify which activities would be sacrificed. If the body is substantial, “special circumstances” require a further evaluative assessment of whether its resources exceptionally justify public funding. A charity cannot establish special circumstances merely by asserting that its trustees will not divert resources from other priorities. Judicial review does not permit substitution of the court’s view unless the decision is irrational or otherwise unlawful.

The Traveller Movement, a charity representing Gypsy, Roma and Traveller communities, was a core participant in the Vaccinations and Therapeutics module of the UK COVID-19 Inquiry. The Inquiry Chair granted separate legal representation but repeatedly refused public funding, finding that the claimant was a substantial body capable of funding its own representation and that no special circumstances justified an award.

After a renewed application and further financial information, the Chair maintained the refusal on 22 July 2024. Permission to seek judicial review was refused on the papers, and the claimant renewed its application before Chamberlain J. The issues were whether the claim was out of time and whether the Chair had erred in assessing substantial body, special circumstances, procedural fairness and adequacy of reasons.

1. Permission refused. The claim was not out of time. The Chair’s letter of 11 December 2023 naturally suggested a general review, so the claimant was justified in treating the July 2024 decision as the operative decision on the relevant issues.
2. Section 40 of the Inquiries Act 2005 conferred a broad discretion to fund legal representation, subject to ministerial conditions. That discretion had to be exercised in accordance with section 17(3), including fairness and regard to avoiding unnecessary cost.
3. The proper approach to the word “substantial” was that stated by Lord Mustill in R v Monopolies and Mergers Commission ex p South Yorkshire Transport Ltd. First, the court should avoid imposing spurious precision on an imprecise term. Secondly, application of the term to the facts involved an evaluative judgment which the court could displace only if irrational.
4. Paragraph 7 of the Prime Minister’s Determination required a broad judgment about the body’s size and resources. At that stage the Chair was not required to examine individual funding sources or the activities that might be forgone if the claimant funded representation itself. The finding that the claimant was a substantial body was neither irrational nor wrong.
5. “Special circumstances” was also deliberately broad. The Chair was entitled to focus in greater detail on whether the claimant’s income and reserves made exceptional public funding justified. The centrality of Gypsy, Roma and Traveller issues was accepted as part of the funding context; it did not require a separate express treatment in the decision.
6. A charity could not establish special circumstances merely by asserting that its trustees would not divert resources from other priorities. The Chair was entitled to consider the claimant’s financial position and conclude that it had not significantly deteriorated.
7. The procedural and reasons grounds were not reasonably arguable. The July decision sufficiently explained why the refusal remained in place, and there was no indication that relevant representations had been ignored.

Permission to apply for judicial review was refused on the papers by Linden J on 8 October 2024. The claimant renewed the application before the High Court (Administrative Court), which refused permission.