Save Our Southbank v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government & Ors

In a planning challenge, development plan policies must be interpreted objectively and in context, but their application and the weight given to competing policies remain matters of planning judgment. Policies seeking to optimise housing delivery do not necessarily impose an absolute requirement to provide housing where other policies give greater weight to strategic uses in the Central Activities Zone.

A decision letter may adopt an inspector’s findings by clear inference where it records them without disagreement and the decision is read fairly as a whole. For a tall building outside an identified location, the appropriateness of the site and compliance with detailed design and impact criteria are distinct questions. A finding that the location is appropriate does not preclude a finding of conflict with detailed policy requirements.

The claimant challenged under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 the Secretary of State’s decision to grant planning permission for redevelopment of the former London Television Centre at 60–72 Upper Ground, London.

The challenge alleged inadequate reasons concerning heritage assets, misinterpretation of development plan policies requiring housing, failure to consider retention of the existing tower for residential use under circular economy policies, and irrational or inadequately explained application of tall-building policy Q26 of the Lambeth Local Plan.

The court considered whether the decision letter, read with the inspector’s report and in context, disclosed lawful reasoning on those four grounds.

1. Ground 1 dismissed. The statutory duties concerning listed buildings and conservation areas require the decision-maker to identify whether the development causes harm and, where relevant, assess its degree. The decision-maker need not repeat an express finding for every heritage asset if the decision letter, read fairly as a whole, makes the position clear. The Secretary of State’s identification of harm to particular assets in DL23–DL26 and his overall summary in DL28 supported the inference that the other assets mentioned in DL27 were found not to be harmed. His unqualified reference to the inspector’s conclusions, without expressing disagreement, indicated acceptance of them. The omission of the Strand Conservation Area by name did not create legal inadequacy because it was covered by the inspector’s identified assessment.

2. Ground 2 dismissed. Policies H1(B)(2) and H1(F) of the London Plan and policy H1 of the Local Plan supported housing delivery but did not impose an absolute requirement that the scheme include housing. They had to be balanced against policy SD5, which gave greater weight to offices and other Central Activities Zone strategic functions. The inspector correctly interpreted the policies and reasonably concluded that a scheme without housing could comply with the development plan as a whole.

3. The phrase preferred use in site allocation 9 allowed flexibility. It did not require every listed use to be delivered within every part of the allocated site. The absence of housing therefore did not, by itself, conflict with the allocation.

4. Ground 3 dismissed. Since the alleged housing requirement was not established, the challenge based on retaining and reusing Kent House for residential purposes fell away. The inspector and Secretary of State were entitled to accept that demolition and redevelopment complied with the circular economy policies on the facts found. Had housing been required, proper consideration of residential retention and reuse would have been necessary.

5. Ground 4 dismissed. Policy Q26 required separate consideration of whether the north building’s location was appropriate under Part B and whether the building satisfied Part A’s detailed criteria. The finding that the riverside location was appropriate did not conflict with later findings that the building’s design, visual effects and townscape impact caused some conflict with Part A(i)–(iii). The reasons were rational, internally coherent and adequately explained.

6. The claim was dismissed.

This was a first-instance claim under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Permission to bring the claim was granted by Lang J on 7 May 2024.