Simon Goldsmith, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Justice

Where the Secretary of State rejects Parole Board advice on a prisoner's progression, the decision remains subject to rationality review. The Secretary of State may accept or reject the advice, but must act reasonably and on the evidence.

Where the Parole Board has a particular advantage in assessing interlocking risk issues, especially after hearing expert evidence, the Secretary of State must give the advice adequate weight. A bare statement that the advice has been considered is insufficient where the decision departs from important diagnostic and risk conclusions. The reasons must explain the departure and the evidential basis for it. The assessment remains fact-specific; this does not impose a universal requirement for lengthy or prescriptive reasons.

The claimant, a life prisoner, challenged the Secretary of State's decision to reject the Parole Board's recommendation that he be transferred from Category B to open conditions. The Secretary of State instead directed progression through the closed prison categories before any move to open conditions.

The Parole Board had heard evidence over two days from the claimant, prison staff and psychologists, including independent experts. It concluded that there was no core risk-reduction work outstanding and recommended a move to open conditions for testing and acclimatisation.

The central issue was whether the Secretary of State's reasons for rejecting that advice were rational and adequately engaged with the Parole Board's particular assessment of risk, autism and personality traits.

1. Claim succeeded. The Secretary of State's decision was declared unreasonable and unlawful, quashed, and remitted for reconsideration.
2. The governing approach was that stated by the Court of Appeal in Sneddon and Oakley [2024] EWCA Civ 1258. The decision belongs to the Secretary of State, who may accept or reject Parole Board advice. Both bodies possess relevant expertise, but the Secretary of State must act rationally and reasonably.
3. The Parole Board's functions and the Secretary of State's functions overlap but are not identical. The Board advises on risk reduction and suitability for release or open conditions, whereas the Secretary of State must also consider whether there is a wholly persuasive case for transfer from closed to open conditions.
4. The Secretary of State's decision was irrational because it failed to give adequate weight to the Board's conclusions and departed from them without adequate explanation. The Board had heard and tested evidence from five psychologists and other professional witnesses. It therefore had a particular advantage concerning the interlocking issues of autism, personality traits and direct and indirect risk.
5. The decision-making materials recorded the Board's conclusions but did not explain why the Board was wrong, why the Secretary of State was better placed to assess the relevant risk, or why the nuanced diagnostic findings should be rejected. The decision was based on evidence but was not properly explained and flew in the face of the evidence presented to the Board.
6. The court stressed that rationality decisions of this kind are fact-specific. The judgment did not prescribe a universal format or require the Secretary of State to address every part of the Board's advice at great length.