LBX v John Ross Charles Aldridge & Anor

Under section 1(4) of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, a party making a bona fide settlement may pursue contribution without proving its own actual liability. The settling party must still establish that the proposed contributor was liable for the same damage. A limitation defence generally concerns the remedy and does not defeat the contribution claim, although it may bear on whether the settlement was bona fide. A subsisting default judgment on liability prevents the defaulting party from disputing the underlying wrongs unless the judgment is set aside. A bona fide settlement may therefore support summary judgment for contribution where liability is otherwise established. The contribution may amount to a complete indemnity where the primary wrongdoer bears full responsibility.

The school sought contribution and a full indemnity from a former teacher in respect of its settlement of the claimant’s historic sexual-abuse claim. The claimant alleged that the teacher had sexually assaulted her while she was a pupil and that the school was vicariously liable or negligent. The teacher had been convicted of rape but had not defended the civil proceedings.

The school settled the claimant’s claim for £40,000 plus costs. It then applied for summary judgment on its contribution notice. The teacher relied on alleged substantive and limitation defences, disputed the effect of the settlement, and contended that a judgment assessing his liability at £1 prevented a larger contribution claim.

1. Summary judgment. The court applied CPR 24.3. The teacher’s case had to show a realistic, more than fanciful, prospect of success, and the court was not to conduct a mini-trial. Clear points of law could nevertheless be determined summarily.
2. Section 1(4) of the 1978 Act. The school’s settlement was bona fide. Under WH Newson Holdings Ltd v IMI Plc, the school did not have to establish its own actual liability or overcome a collateral limitation defence. Section 1(4) did not, however, deem the teacher to have committed the alleged assaults. The teacher remained entitled in principle to contest his own substantive liability. Perry v Merriman confirmed that section 1(4) concerns the settling defendant’s liability and does not dispense with proof that the contributor was liable for the same damage.
3. Default judgments. The June 2021 order provided for automatic judgment on liability if the teacher failed to file a defence. The March 2022 order was construed as a liability judgment against the teacher, with the £1 assessment preventing double recovery by the claimant, rather than limiting the school’s contribution claim. The judgments were binding and could not be set aside. Applying CPR 13.3 and the relief-from-sanctions principles in FXF v English Karate Federation Ltd and Denton v White, the breach was serious and significant, there was no good reason, and the application was not prompt. The teacher’s position as a litigant in person did not excuse non-compliance: Barton v Wright Hassall LLP.
4. Liability and amount. The default judgments prevented the teacher from disputing liability. The school was entitled to 100% contribution under section 2 of the 1978 Act because the teacher was the primary wrongdoer. The £40,000 damages settlement did not exceed the likely value of the teacher’s liability. The teacher was ordered to contribute £40,000.
5. Costs. The teacher was liable in principle for the claimant’s settlement costs, but their reasonableness and proportionality required detailed assessment. An interim payment of £60,000 was ordered, subject to adjustment. The school’s own costs were reserved for further argument.