Christopher Ashford Reynolds v Paulene Saul

Under the Presumption of Death Act 2013, the word “missing” is a general descriptor and does not impose a separate jurisdictional threshold. A declaration is mandatory where the statutory conditions are established, but the applicant must first satisfy the jurisdictional requirements, including domicile or habitual residence where applicable.

A person may establish that someone has not been known to be alive for seven years through objective enquiries, even where the applicant is a stranger. However, the required domicile must be proved by evidence; ownership or joint purchase of property in England and Wales, mortgage arrangements and the absence of evidence of another domicile may be insufficient.

The claimant, acting as personal representative of Dennis John Fullwood’s estate, sought a declaration that Paulene Saul was presumed to have died under the Presumption of Death Act 2013. Ms Saul was recorded as a joint proprietor of Mr Fullwood’s property in 1973, but could not be traced and there was no reliable evidence of her subsequent life.

The claimant argued that Ms Saul was last known to be alive on 1 October 1973, had not been known to be alive for at least seven years, and should be presumed to have died on 1 October 1980. The issues included whether she was “missing”, whether the jurisdictional domicile or habitual-residence requirement was met, whether the claimant had sufficient interest, and whether the statutory evidential threshold was satisfied.

1. The claim was dismissed because the claimant failed to prove that Ms Saul was domiciled in England and Wales on 1 October 1973 or habitually resident there throughout the preceding year. This jurisdictional failure prevented the making of a declaration.

2. The term “missing” in section 1(1) of the Presumption of Death Act 2013 is a general descriptor. It adds nothing to the express conditions that the person is thought to have died or has not been known to be alive for at least seven years. The Act therefore does not require proof that the person was independently “missing” as an additional criterion.

3. The court distinguished the Guardianship (Missing Persons) Act 2017, which contains a detailed definition of “missing” because missing status is a necessary condition for appointing a guardian over a living person’s affairs.

4. Domicile has its ordinary common-law meaning. The evidence that Ms Saul jointly purchased property in England and Wales, used an address there, and obtained a local-authority mortgage did not establish that England and Wales was her permanent home. The absence of evidence of a foreign domicile was insufficient.

5. The claimant had a sufficient interest. The estate had a real and substantial interest in determining which joint proprietor survived and whether the property fell into Mr Fullwood’s estate.

6. Although there was no evidence that Ms Saul had died, all reasonable enquiries established that she had not been known to be alive for at least seven years. That requirement may be proved by an objective enquiry undertaken by a stranger, provided the applicant has sufficient interest.

7. But for the failure to establish domicile or habitual residence, the court would have made a declaration that Ms Saul was presumed to have died on 1 October 1980 under section 2(4) of the Act.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.