Say Chong Lim & Ors v Chee Kong Ong (a bankrupt)

Sentencing for contempt requires assessment of culpability and harm, followed by consideration of whether a fine is sufficient and, if custody is necessary, the shortest proportionate term. The court must consider mitigation, the impact on others, early admissions, totality and whether suspension would secure compliance.

Persistent, deliberate and wilful breaches of freezing and disclosure orders, accompanied by false statements and asset dissipation, may justify the statutory maximum of two years. A late admission attracts limited credit where the contemnor previously denied liability and remains non-compliant. Suspension is inappropriate without a real prospect of compliance.

The defendant had admitted multiple contempts arising from proceedings in which the claimants had obtained judgment for more than £6.7 million. The contempts included breaches of worldwide freezing and disclosure orders, dissipation of assets, false statements about assets, failure to provide information and concealed bank accounts.

The hearing concerned sentence only. The central issues were the seriousness of the contempts, the credit for the defendant’s late admissions, the statutory maximum, and whether the sentence should be suspended or adjourned to encourage compliance.

1. Sentence. The defendant was sentenced to immediate imprisonment for 22 months. The sentence reflected multiple serious and persistent contempts, including deliberate breaches of freezing and disclosure orders, dissipation of assets, false statements and concealment of information.
2. Sentencing approach. The court applied the principles summarised in Attorney General v Crosland and Business Mortgage Finance v Hussain. The relevant considerations included culpability, harm, whether a fine was sufficient, proportionality, mitigation, the impact on others, admissions, totality and the purposes of punishment and securing compliance.
3. Seriousness. The contempts caused substantial and irremediable prejudice. The defendant’s conduct was knowing, deliberate and continuing. His bankruptcy meant that a fine would be pointless. The statutory maximum of two years under s. 14(1) of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 was justified by continuing and wilful breach.
4. Admissions. The admission was treated as equivalent to an admission at the start of trial. It therefore warranted a modest reduction, but less than 10%, because the defendant had previously mounted a vigorous defence, caused substantial wasted preparation costs and remained persistently non-compliant.
5. Structure and compliance. Concurrent and consecutive periods produced a two-year starting point, comprising punitive and coercive elements. The total was reduced by two months. The defendant could apply to remit part of the sentence if he complied with outstanding disclosure and information obligations, but the sentence should not ordinarily fall below 18 months.
6. Suspension. Suspension or adjournment was refused. There was no reliable medical, family or other evidence showing that immediate custody was inappropriate, and no real prospect that the late-arriving assistance of a family friend would secure compliance.