National Highways Limited v Adelheid Russenberger & Ors

Sanction for civil contempt is fact-sensitive and has no tariff. The court must assess culpability and harm, then consider all relevant circumstances, including deliberate defiance, prejudice, mitigation, cooperation, admissions, apology and the prospect of future compliance.

Conscientious protest motives may justify a lesser sanction where the contemnor engages with the court’s expectation of obedience and there is a realistic prospect of rehabilitation. They do not provide a licence to breach an injunction. Imprisonment is reserved for cases passing the custody threshold, must be proportionate, and may be suspended where appropriate. A criminal sentence for the same conduct may justify no additional penalty for civil contempt.

National Highways Limited applied to commit 18 defendants for contempt arising from alleged breaches of an injunction restraining persons unknown associated with Just Stop Oil from entering or remaining on, or affixing themselves to, structures on the M25.

The application followed the court’s earlier judgment in National Highways Limited v Kirin & others, [2023] EWHC 3000 (KB), which had addressed related liability and sanction principles. Eleven defendants compromised the applications by giving two-year undertakings. The knowledge issue concerning two further defendants was adjourned.

The judgment therefore determined sanction for five defendants who admitted breach and actual knowledge. Two had already received suspended custodial sentences for public nuisance. The central issue was the appropriate sanction for the remaining three, having regard to the disruption, culpability, mitigation, apologies and future intentions.

1. General principles. There is no tariff for civil contempt. The court has a broad discretion to impose imprisonment, a fine or sequestration, directed to punishment, future compliance and rehabilitation. The first step is to assess culpability and harm, followed by consideration of all relevant circumstances, including deliberateness, prejudice, cooperation, admissions, apology, character and personal mitigation.
2. The defendants’ conduct involved deliberate defiance of the injunction and caused severe disruption, economic loss, police deployment and risks to emergency vehicles and the public. Their conscientious climate-related motives were relevant mitigation, but did not authorise disobedience to court orders.
3. The defendants’ apologies and statements that they would comply in future showed engagement in the dialogue identified in the authorities. The court was entitled to take them at their word. The custody threshold was nevertheless passed in the cases of Rennie-Nash, Hekt and Mitchell. Fines were inappropriate.
4. Differences in the amount of traffic disruption did not justify material distinctions because the defendants formed part of one deliberate and concerted disruption. Hekt received some mitigation for cooperating with police. Mitchell’s previous undertaking, compliance, caring responsibilities and personal circumstances also reduced the sanction, but did not justify dispensing with it.
5. Rennie-Nash was committed for 40 days, Hekt for 32 days and Mitchell for 32 days, each suspended for two years on the terms imposed in the Kirin judgment. Whitehouse and Springorum had each received six-month suspended custodial sentences for public nuisance. In light of those sentences, and their apologies and future intentions, no further penalty was imposed for contempt.