Birmingham City Council v Adhnan Mohammed

Contempt of court arising from breach of a civil injunction must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, although the proceedings remain civil. In sentencing, the court should assess culpability and harm, including intended or at-risk harm, by analogy with the Civil Justice Council matrix where appropriate. The sentencing objectives are securing compliance, punishment and rehabilitation. A first deliberate breach involving dangerous street cruising and racing may justify custody where a fine or deferred consideration would be insufficient. Suspension is ordinarily the first means of testing future compliance where the contemnor has good character, remorse and an intention to comply. Credit should be given for an admission made at the first opportunity after legal advice. Costs protection associated with civil legal aid does not apply where criminal legal aid funds the defence of civil contempt proceedings.

Birmingham City Council alleged that Mr Adhnan Mohammed breached an interim injunction prohibiting participation in street cruises within Birmingham. The injunction had been granted and subsequently amended in earlier proceedings. On 28 January 2024, the defendant was arrested after driving at about 50 miles per hour in areas subject to 40 and 30 mile per hour limits and racing other vehicles. He admitted breaching the injunction, subject to disputing the precise speed and manner of changing lanes.

The court determined whether contempt was proved and, if so, the appropriate sentence and costs order.

1. Contempt proved. The defendant’s admission, police evidence and video footage established beyond reasonable doubt that he breached the injunction by participating in a street cruise involving racing other vehicles. Civil contempt proceedings remain civil proceedings, but the claimant bears the criminal burden of proof.
2. Sentencing framework. The court applied the objectives identified in Lovett v Wigan Borough Council [2022] EWCA Civ 1631: securing further compliance, punishment and rehabilitation. It adopted the approach summarised in Attorney General v Crosland [2021] UKSC 15 and endorsed in Breen v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [2022] EWCA Civ 1405. The Civil Justice Council matrix was used by analogy, consistently with Birmingham City Council v Lloyd [2023] EWCA Civ 1355, because the contempt involved anti-social behaviour outside the statutory scheme.
3. Culpability and harm. The breach was deliberate but a first breach and therefore fell within culpability category B, rather than high-culpability category A. Harm fell within category 2, towards its upper end, because the racing created a very significant risk of injury to drivers, passengers, spectators, pedestrians and property, despite limited actual harm.
4. Sentence. The applicable starting point was one month’s imprisonment. A fine or deferred consideration would not sufficiently mark the seriousness of racing at speed on busy urban roads. The appropriate sentence was 33 days’ imprisonment, reduced by one third to 22 days for the admission. The sentence was suspended for 12 months on condition of compliance with the injunction as amended.
5. Costs. The claimant was entitled to its costs under CPR 44.2(2), summarily assessed at £2,234. Following Secretary of State for Transport v Cuciurean [2022] EWCA Civ 661, criminal legal aid did not confer the usual civil legal-aid costs protection. Payment was ordered at £50 per month, beginning on 20 April 2024.