Birmingham City Council v Mohammed Daanyaal & Anor

In civil contempt proceedings for breach of an injunction, contempt must be proved to the criminal standard, namely beyond reasonable doubt. Sentencing aims to secure compliance with the order, punish the breach and promote rehabilitation. The court should assess culpability and harm, including actual harm and significant intended or potential harm, and then take account of aggravating and mitigating features.

Deliberate participation in high-speed racing on public roads may justify immediate custody, even where no actual injury occurs. A custodial sentence may properly be suspended where suspension is the first appropriate means of securing future compliance. Costs incurred in contempt proceedings may be enforceable notwithstanding criminal legal aid.

Birmingham City Council brought contempt proceedings against Mohammed Daanyaal and Bradley Hayes for breaches of an interim injunction prohibiting participation in street cruises within Birmingham. The injunction had been granted and subsequently amended in earlier proceedings.

Each defendant admitted a deliberate breach after arrest. Daanyaal admitted racing at approximately 80 mph on an urban dual carriageway in wet conditions. Hayes admitted racing at approximately 60–65 mph and undertaking manoeuvres while spectators watched. The court had to determine whether contempt was established and, if so, the appropriate penalties and costs orders.

1. Contempt established. Although contempt proceedings remained civil proceedings, the claimant bore the burden of proving each breach beyond reasonable doubt. The admissions, written evidence and video footage established contempt in both cases (para 17).
2. Sentencing approach. The court adopted the purposes identified in Lovett v Wigan: securing future compliance, punishment and rehabilitation. It also adopted the approach summarised in Attorney General v Crosland and endorsed in Breen v Esso Petroleum. The guidance in Annex 1 to the Civil Justice Council report concerning contempt arising from orders under the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 was appropriately used by analogy, consistently with Birmingham City Council v Lloyd (paras 20–21).
3. Culpability and harm. Both breaches were deliberate and fell within culpability category B. Harm was category 2, at its highest end. Assessment included not only harm actually caused but also intended harm and the significant risk of harm created by high-speed racing on busy urban roads (paras 22–24).
4. Penalty. Custody was necessary because neither deferred consideration nor a fine would sufficiently penalise the breaches or secure compliance. Daanyaal received 42 days, reduced to 28 days for an early admission. Hayes received 35 days, reduced to 23 days. Each sentence was suspended for 12 months on condition of compliance with the injunction in its current or subsequently amended form. Daanyaal’s greater sentence reflected higher speed, wet conditions and the aggravating feature of excessively tinted front windows (paras 25–32).
5. Costs. The claimant was entitled to its costs. Costs were summarily assessed at £2,056.72 against Daanyaal and £2,431.30 against Hayes, payable at £100 per month. Following Secretary of State for Transport v Cuciurean, the costs were enforceable despite the defendants’ receipt of criminal legal aid (paras 33–37).

The judgment was a first-instance determination of contempt penalties and costs. Each defendant had a right of appeal to the Court of Appeal, Civil Division, within 21 days.