U (Welfare), Re

In determining a child’s living arrangements and contact, the child’s welfare is paramount. The court must apply the welfare checklist and presume that parental involvement furthers welfare unless the contrary is shown. Where domestic abuse, instability or indirect emotional harm is established, involvement and contact may require supervision or other protective conditions.

A section 91(14) order is a protective filter, not a bar on applications. It may be made where repeated or unreasonable litigation, domestic abuse, oppressive conduct, or a need for respite creates a risk of harm to the child or another relevant individual. Its scope and duration must be necessary and proportionate to the harm avoided.

The mother sought orders returning U, a young child, to her care in France. The father sought continuation of U’s residence with him in England, protective orders, and a period of respite from further applications. The mother’s applications included an application under the 1980 Hague Convention and a later application under the Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985, which the court treated substantively as a living-with application.

Following an earlier recognition of a French order and a fact-finding judgment, the central questions were where U should live, whether contact with his mother was in his welfare interests and, if so, on what safeguards, and whether restrictions on further applications were required.

1. Living arrangements. U’s welfare was paramount under section 1 of the Children Act 1989. The court considered his vulnerability, adverse early experiences, need for stability, the risks arising from the mother’s behaviour and mental-health-related episodes, and the effect of parental conflict on the father’s ability to care for him. U was settled with his father, whereas relocation to France involved a significant risk of further emotional and psychological harm. U should therefore live with his father in England.
2. Parental involvement and contact. The statutory presumption of beneficial parental involvement was rebutted by the evidence of direct and indirect risk. Nevertheless, maintaining U’s relationship with his mother remained important. Contact was ordered on a supervised 2:1 basis, for two hours every other month, supported by indirect contact.
3. Protective orders. A prohibited steps order was necessary to prevent the mother removing U from the father’s care or from school. The court declined to remove the mother’s parental responsibility because the evidence did not justify that draconian remedy. A non-molestation order was made under the relevant provisions of the Family Law Act 1996 to reduce the risk of significant emotional harm to U and protect both U and his father.
4. Restriction on applications. Applying the principles in Re P and Re A, and FPR 2010 PD12Q, the court made a section 91(14) order. The litigation had caused the father substantial stress and anxiety, with consequential effects on U. U required certainty and respite. The order was made until September 2026, which was necessary and proportionate to the identified risks.