St Albans City and District Council v Anthony Hugh Taylerson & Ors

An injunction under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 is discretionary. The court must exercise that discretion judicially and proportionately, without substituting its own planning judgment for that of the planning authority. It may, however, assess the evidence supporting an actual or apprehended breach, including the likelihood of future unlawful development and the authority’s treatment of material considerations.

For anticipatory relief, the court should assess whether there is a strong probability of infringement and whether the resulting harm would be so grave and irreparable that later interim relief and damages would be inadequate. The defendant’s attitude, the passage of time, available enforcement measures and the authority’s engagement with the defendant are relevant. Green Belt harm may carry substantial weight, but an injunction remains fact-sensitive and must be proportionate.

The claimant local authority sought a final injunction restraining actual or apprehended breaches of planning control on land adjacent to Redbourn bypass. An interlocutory injunction had been granted in 2021 and continued pending trial. The fifth defendant company, whose sole director and shareholder was Mr Myles Green, was joined before trial and applied to discharge the injunction.

The issues included the statutory test under section 187B of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the court’s role in assessing planning matters, the approach to anticipatory final injunctions, the significance of Green Belt harm, and the use of injunctions against persons unknown. The court also considered the position of the former owner, the former intermediary owner and the second defendant, who gave an undertaking.

1. The court refused a final injunction against the fifth defendant company and the fourth defendant persons unknown. It dismissed the claim against the first defendant and granted final injunctive relief against the third defendant. The second defendant had given an undertaking substantially in the terms sought.

2. Section 187B confers a discretionary power. The court must decide whether relief is just, convenient and proportionate in all the circumstances. It must not revisit the planning merits or assume functions allocated to planning authorities. The local authority’s planning judgment is relevant, but its weight depends on whether it considered all material matters: South Buckinghamshire District Council v Porter [2003] 2 AC 558.

3. The court may assess the strength of the evidence supporting the alleged or apprehended breach. That assessment is necessary to determine necessity and proportionality. The court therefore considered the evidence concerning the company’s intentions, the tree clearance, the fence, the alleged concealment and the company’s engagement with planning advisers.

4. The application was quia timet in substance. The court adopted the two-stage approach in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons unknown [2018] EWHC 2456 (Ch): whether there was a strong probability of breach unless restrained, and whether the resulting harm would be so grave and irreparable that immediate later relief and damages would be inadequate. The inquiry is multifactorial. The defendant’s attitude and the time elapsed were significant.

5. Green Belt preservation and the irreversibility of unlawful development carried substantial weight. They did not, however, overcome the absence of current evidence showing a sufficient probability that the company or Mr Green would undertake unlawful development. The claimant’s failure to update its investigations, use available powers such as section 330, or engage with the company materially weakened the proportionality case.

6. As to the third defendant, the absence of communication despite repeated attempts created a strong probability of future breach, and the gravity of resulting Green Belt harm was established. Relief was therefore granted against him. An injunction against persons unknown required a compelling need and a real and imminent threat. Those requirements were not met, particularly because the alleged risk concerned development requiring a nexus with the land rather than unauthorised encampment.

This was a first-instance decision. An interlocutory injunction had been granted ex parte on 5 March 2021 and continued before the final hearing.