Andrew Bridgen MP v Matthew Hancock MP

In a defamation claim, reference is an essential element which must be properly pleaded. Where identification depends on events or facts outside the publication, the case is one of reference innuendo, even if the claimant also relies on persons acquainted with him. The claimant must plead the special facts, identify the readers who knew them, or plead facts justifying an inference that some readers knew them, and explain why a reasonable reader would understand the words to refer to the claimant.

A defective pleading should ordinarily be amended where there is a real prospect of curing the defect. Irrelevant material and submissions about meaning do not belong in a statement of case.

The claimant brought a defamation claim concerning a tweet published by the defendant, which referred to a sitting MP who had allegedly expressed anti-Semitic, anti-vaccine and anti-scientific conspiracy theories. The tweet did not name the claimant.

The defendant applied under CPR 3.4(2)(a) to strike out the pleaded case on reference and a paragraph concerning alleged innuendo meaning. The claimant relied on his political activities, an earlier tweet, criticism of that tweet, the withdrawal of the party whip and the defendant’s parliamentary question. The central issues were whether those matters constituted ordinary reference or reference innuendo, whether the pleading adequately identified the relevant readers and connecting facts, and whether any defect could be cured by amendment.

1. Strike-out principles. An application under CPR 3.4(2)(a) is determined by analysing the pleading and assuming its factual allegations are true. Strike-out is inappropriate unless the claim is bound to fail. Where a defect can realistically be cured, the claimant should ordinarily be given an opportunity to amend.
2. Reference. Reference is an essential element of defamation. A claimant may establish it by ordinary reference, where the words identify him or would reasonably lead persons acquainted with him to believe that he was referred to, or by reference innuendo, where particular extrinsic facts known to readers would lead a reasonable person to that conclusion.
3. The claimant’s reliance on events occurring during the two hours before publication, including his tweet, the criticisms of it and the withdrawal of the whip, meant that his case was one of reference innuendo. Such facts could not simply be treated as attributes known to a hypothetical acquaintance. The claimant had to plead that identified readers knew the facts, or that they were sufficiently notorious for an inference that some readers knew them, and that a reasonable reader with that knowledge would understand the publication to concern him.
4. The pleaded case was defective, but it had a realistic prospect of being cured. Paragraphs concerning the claimant’s tweet, published criticisms and the press statement could be amended. The claimant’s general record as a vaccine-sceptic MP was insufficient by itself, but could potentially be relied on cumulatively with the other special facts.
5. The personal text communication with the Chief Whip, paragraphs containing argument about what others had said, and paragraph 24’s purported innuendo meaning were irrelevant or submissions rather than proper pleaded facts. Paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 19 and 24 were struck out. The claim itself was not struck out. The claimant was given an opportunity to amend, with the precise order to be settled after hearing counsel.

First-instance decision. No prior appellate decision is stated in the judgment.