Banner Universal Motion Pictures Limited v Wiggin LLP & Anor

Claims against solicitors arising from earlier failed intellectual-property proceedings may be summarily dismissed or struck out where the pleaded breach, causation and loss have no realistic prospect of proof. A claimant must identify the specific breach and prove that, but for it, the underlying litigation had a better prospect of success and the resulting loss can be valued.

A solicitor acting for an opponent in hostile litigation normally owes no duty of care to the opposing party. Exceptional responsibility may arise where the solicitor has undertaken responsibilities beyond the ordinary retainer, but that exception did not apply. Vague, prolix and unevidenced allegations, particularly where they create unnecessary unrecoverable costs, may also constitute an abuse of process. Claims issued outside the applicable limitation period are barred.

Banner Universal Motion Pictures Limited brought professional-negligence, contract and duty-of-care claims against Wiggin LLP and Fox Williams LLP, the solicitors involved in earlier proceedings concerning the television format Minute Winner. The claimant alleged that documents and other evidence had not been deployed, that disclosure applications and case-management choices had been mishandled, and that these matters caused the earlier claims to fail.

Both defendants applied under CPR 3.4 and CPR 24.2 for strike-out and summary judgment. The central issues were whether either defendant owed the alleged duties, whether any breach could have caused recoverable loss, whether the claims were abusive, and whether they were statute-barred.

1. Outcome. The claims against both defendants were struck out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b), and dismissed on summary-judgment grounds under CPR 24.2. The proposed amendments did not cure the defects. The claims were also held to be out of time.
2. Fox Williams. The alleged omitted documents, including the Links Evidence, the Read Your Fortune document and the Clash of Choirs article, had no probative relevance to the issues determined in the earlier proceedings. A specific-disclosure application seeking any evidence that might assist would have been doomed. Proceeding under the shorter trial scheme was a proportionate case-management decision. None of these matters constituted breach, and none could have altered the earlier result.
3. Causation and loss. In a lost-litigation or loss-of-chance claim, the claimant must show a real prospect of succeeding in the underlying claim absent the breach, identify the increased chance lost, and provide a monetary valuation. The pleaded case did not satisfy those requirements. The earlier claims had been dismissed for substantive legal reasons, so the alleged omissions could not have caused the claimed losses.
4. Wiggin. Applying Al-Kandari v Brown [1988] QB 665 and NRAM v Steel [2018] 1 WLR 1190, a solicitor acting for a party in hostile litigation generally owes no duty of care to the opponent. Al-Kandari was distinguishable because the solicitor had voluntarily undertaken responsibility for holding passports to the court’s order. Wiggin had undertaken no comparable responsibility.
5. Abuse and limitation. The pleadings were unreasonably vague and prolix, causation and loss were inadequately pleaded, and the serious allegations lacked factual or evidential foundation. Their continuation would cause unrecoverable expense and obstruct the just disposal of proceedings. This independently justified strike out as an abuse of process, applying Cleeves v University of Oxford [2017] EWHC 702 (QB). The alleged breaches and damage occurred no later than the earlier hearing or circulation of the draft judgment. The claims issued in October 2023 were therefore outside the six-year periods under sections 2 and 5 of the Limitation Act 1980. Section 32(1)(b) did not assist because no relevant fact had been deliberately concealed.
6. Costs. Indemnity costs were ordered for both defendants. The claims were marked as totally without merit.

First-instance decision. The judgment records the earlier proceedings before Snowden J, in which the claimant’s intellectual-property claims were dismissed, but this was not an appeal from that decision.