Dusko Knezevic v The Government of the Republic of Montenegro

In an extradition appeal, the court will not interfere with an evaluative decision unless the overall assessment was wrong or a crucial factor should have been weighed so differently as to make the decision wrong. Alleged conduct involving intentional retention of another’s money for a bank’s benefit may compel an inference of dishonesty and therefore constitute an extradition offence. Under section 81 of the Extradition Act 2003, political motivation need only form part of the purpose; however, the issue remains one of evidence and evaluation. For Article 3 challenges based on prison conditions, a Convention state benefits from a rebuttable presumption of compliance. Specific assurances may defeat an alleged real risk where they adequately address the conditions relied upon.

Montenegro sought the applicant’s extradition to stand trial for alleged fraud, money laundering and misuse of authority in business. The Senior District Judge found no bar to extradition and ordered the case to be sent to the Secretary of State under section 87(3) of the Extradition Act 2003.

The applicant sought permission to appeal on three grounds: whether the Airports allegations disclosed an extradition offence; whether extradition was barred by political considerations under section 81; and whether remand conditions in Montenegro created a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. He also applied to adduce fresh evidence.

1. Permission and outcome. Permission to appeal was refused on all three grounds. The applications to adduce fresh evidence were also refused. None of the proposed grounds had any prospect of success.
2. Airports case. The allegations referred to provisions of the Criminal Code of Montenegro requiring wrongful intent and an illicit pecuniary gain. In any event, intentionally directing an officer to retain €3 million belonging to Montenegro Airports in Atlas Bank’s account for the bank’s benefit compelled an inference of dishonesty. The conduct therefore disclosed an extradition offence under section 78(4)(b) of the Extradition Act 2003.
3. Political considerations. The Senior District Judge correctly applied section 81(a) and (b). Political reasons need only form part of the prosecutor’s motivation, but the evidence did not show that the prosecutions were politically motivated. The chronology supported the conclusion that the investigations arose from the collapse and financial difficulties of the applicant’s banks before his later political activity. The Judge was entitled to assess the evidence independently of Interpol, to attach limited weight to the evidence concerning another prosecution, and to conclude that the reports and other material did not establish error in the overall evaluation. The approach in Love v Government of the United States of America was applied.
4. Article 3. The principles stated in Urbonas v Lithuania were applicable. There were no substantial grounds for believing that remand conditions or inter-prisoner violence created a real risk of Article 3 ill-treatment. The presumption that Montenegro would comply with its Convention obligations had not been rebutted by sufficiently cogent evidence. The specific assurance guaranteeing at least three square metres per person, excluding sanitary facilities, was sufficient, and the Judge was entitled to rely on it.
5. Fresh evidence. The documents were unavailable or insufficiently probative for the statutory test in section 106. They could not have led the Judge to reach a different conclusion. The proposed expert evidence was also inadmissible because the witness was not shown to possess expertise on the issues in dispute.

• High Court (Administrative Court): Permission to appeal from the Senior District Judge, Westminster Magistrates’ Court was refused. Applications to adduce fresh evidence were refused.