Angela Mary Heyes & Anor v Sarah Holt

On a reverse summary judgment application, the applicant must show that the claim has no realistic prospect of success and that there is no compelling reason for a trial. The court must avoid a mini-trial, particularly where proprietary estoppel depends on disputed evidence about assurances, reliance, detriment and context. An assurance may remain sufficiently clear even though the property ultimately claimed has been modified or reduced, provided the property was identifiable in context. A conditional order may be made where a claim has a real but weak prospect of success, provided the condition is not impossible to satisfy and does not stifle the claim. An interim injunction may restrain trespass even without a pleaded claim for a final injunction. Where the claimant has no arguable right to possession, the serious-issue threshold is not met and the remaining American Cyanamid stages need not be considered.

The claimants, a daughter and her husband, brought a proprietary estoppel claim against the defendant, the daughter’s mother and executrix of her late husband’s estate. They alleged assurances that the family farm would ultimately become theirs, and relied on those assurances by moving to Cornwall and working in connection with the farm.

The defendant applied for reverse summary judgment, alternatively a conditional order requiring security, and sought an interim injunction restraining the claimants and their livestock from entering or remaining on the farm. The central issues were whether the pleaded assurances were sufficiently clear and intended to be relied upon, whether the evidence made success fanciful, whether security should be required, and whether the defendant could obtain interim relief against trespass.

1. Summary judgment. The application was dismissed because the claim, although weak, had a real rather than fanciful prospect of success. The burden rested on the defendant under CPR rule 24.3. The court could evaluate evidence, but disputed questions concerning what assurances were given, their context, intended reliance and the parties’ state of knowledge required trial and cross-examination. The court was not conducting a mini-trial.
2. Proprietary estoppel. The pleaded case was one of promise or assurance, not acquiescence. It required an assurance by words or conduct, intended or apparently intended to be relied upon, reliance causing detriment, and unconscionability in permitting the owner to resile. The effect on a reasonable person in the recipient’s position was relevant. The assurance had to be sufficiently clear and relate to identified property. The fact that parts of the farm had later been allocated or intended for other beneficiaries did not necessarily prevent a claim to the farm as it existed when performance fell due.
3. Conditional order. Applying the principles in Gama Aviation, the court held that a conditional security order could be made where the claim had a real but weak and unlikely prospect of success. The claimants had not shown on the balance of probabilities that they could not provide security. Charges over available legal or equitable interests and properties were ordered, alternatively payment into court. Failure to comply would result in the claim being struck out.
4. Interim injunction. The defendant’s admitted legal ownership and the claimants’ pleaded future equitable interest meant that there was no serious issue to be tried concerning any present right to possession sufficient to support trespass. Under CPR rule 25.1(4), an interim injunction could nevertheless be granted although no final injunction had been pleaded. The injunction restraining trespass was granted. The balance-of-convenience and adequacy-of-damages stages were therefore irrelevant; in any event, they would have favoured the defendant.
5. The claim was stayed for a second mediation. Further directions were given, including additional disclosure concerning recordings and transcripts.