Ashford Borough Council & Anor v Fergus Wilson

[2024] EWHC 781 (KB)

Case details

Case citations
[2024] EWHC 781 (KB)
Court
High Court (King's Bench Division)
Judgment date
10 April 2024
Judgment text

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Subjects
Public law Civil procedure Contempt of court
Keywords
civil contempt breach of injunction Protection from Harassment Act 1997 course of conduct criminal standard of proof single point of contact harassment committal proceedings
Outcome
application granted in part (specified breaches proved; further sanctions hearing required)
Judicial consideration

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Summary

In civil contempt proceedings for breach of an injunction, the applicant must prove knowledge of the order, conduct amounting to a breach, and knowledge of the facts making the conduct a breach. The criminal standard of proof applies.

Harassment under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 requires a persistent and deliberate course of unacceptable conduct which crosses the boundary from irritation or unreasonableness into oppressive and unacceptable behaviour. The court may consider the cumulative effect of conduct and relevant conduct preceding the injunction where it forms part of a continuous course.

An injunction must be obeyed according to its terms. A party cannot decide that compliance is unreasonable; the proper course is to seek variation.

Factual background

Ashford Borough Council and its Chief Executive applied to commit Fergus Wilson for contempt, alleging 44 breaches of a final injunction made on 22 September 2021. The injunction prohibited harassment of protected persons and required communications with the Council to be made through a specified single point of contact, subject to safeguards for non-harassing communication.

Mr Wilson admitted knowledge of the order and authorship of the relevant correspondence, but disputed that his conduct breached the order. The court considered alleged direct communications with protected persons, correspondence sent through the permitted contact, and whether the communications formed part of a continuing course of harassment.

Held

  1. Applicable approach. The applicants had to prove each alleged contempt to the criminal standard. The court applied the three elements identified in Masri v Consolidated Contractors International Company SAL & Ors: knowledge of the order, conduct involving a breach, and knowledge of the facts making the conduct a breach. Each allegation was considered separately, while the totality of relevant evidence could be considered where a course of conduct was alleged.
  2. Harassment. The court adopted the relevant principles identified in Hayden v Dickinson. Harassment is conduct of sufficient seriousness to cross the boundary from irritation or annoyance into oppressive and unacceptable behaviour. The assessment is objective, but the cumulative impact of repeated conduct may be considered. Relevant conduct before the injunction could be considered because it formed part of a continuous course of conduct.
  3. Single point of contact. The order clearly prohibited contact with protected persons other than the designated contact. Political concerns and freedom of information requests did not justify disregarding that restriction. The defendant could not unilaterally decide that compliance was unreasonable; any challenge had to be made by applying to vary the order.
  4. Harassing communications. Repeated personal comments about an employee’s appearance, allegations that she had committed criminal offences, and suggestions that she should face imprisonment continued the earlier course of harassment. By contrast, submissions concerning the reasonableness of costs or professional charging rates, without allegations of criminality or threats of proceedings, were not proved to amount to harassment.
  5. Litigation correspondence. Communications genuinely connected with the appeal could not be shown to amount to harassment to the criminal standard. After the appeal, however, sending hundreds of pages of irrelevant and oppressive material continued the earlier course of conduct and amounted to harassment.
  6. Disposition. Breaches of the anti-harassment prohibition were proved in allegations 6, 14, 18, 19, 21, 26 and 44. Breaches of the single point of contact provision were proved in allegations 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 43 and 44. The remaining allegations were not proved. A further hearing was required to determine sanctions.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

not stated in the judgment.

Key cases cited

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