Tameside Caravans and Storage Limited v Viavecto Limited

An application to extend time for filing an appellant’s notice is governed by the three-stage approach to relief from sanctions. The court assesses the seriousness and significance of the default, the reason for it, and all the circumstances of the case.

Litigants in person are not generally entitled to a lower standard of compliance. Any latitude operates at the margins, including where a rule is particularly obscure or inaccessible. A conscious decision to proceed without legal representation, despite having the means to obtain it, is not ordinarily a good reason for substantial delay.

At the final stage, the merits should be considered only where the proposed appeal is plainly very strong or very weak. The application was refused.

Tameside Caravans and Storage Limited applied retrospectively to extend the 21-day period for filing an appellant’s notice under CPR 52.12(2). The proposed appeal arose from a possession claim in which the trial judge had refused, on the first day of trial, to permit amendments introducing arguments concerning the validity and form of a declaration intended to exclude security of tenure.

The notice was approximately three months late. The applicant had initially acted through its director, using the wrong form and appeal centre, and later obtained legal assistance. The central issues were whether the delay had a good reason, what allowance should be made for the applicant’s unrepresented status, and whether the proposed appeal had sufficient apparent merit to affect the discretionary assessment.

1. Application refused. The failure to file a compliant appellant’s notice within the prescribed period was serious and significant. The overall delay was approximately three months and affected both procedural compliance and the substance of the proposed appeal.
2. The applicable approach was the three-stage test explained in Mitchell v News Group Newspapers Ltd and Denton v T.H. White Ltd: assess the seriousness and significance of the breach, identify why it occurred, and evaluate all the circumstances, giving particular weight to the factors in CPR 3.9(1).
3. The applicant’s status as a litigant in person did not provide a good reason for the delay. The rules governing the correct appeal centre were not particularly obscure or inaccessible. The applicant had known of the 21-day deadline, had funds to obtain representation, and had consciously chosen to proceed without promptly instructing new solicitors or existing counsel.
4. The limited latitude sometimes available to litigants in person operates at the margins. It does not generally justify disapplying procedural rules or applying a lower standard of compliance. The court declined to endorse the wider formulation of a general duty to assist litigants in the context of relief from sanctions, while recognising that appropriate assistance may be given consistently with judicial impartiality.
5. The court considered the merits because the proposed appeal was plainly very weak. The trial judge was entitled to require pleading of factual allegations supporting the contention that the declaration was invalid. Under CPR 16.5(2), a defendant denying an allegation must state the reasons for doing so. The proposed points involved factual matters, including service of notice, the form used, possible estoppel, and the parties’ knowledge, rather than pure questions of law.
6. The trial judge was also entitled to refuse amendment where the late allegations would cause prejudice and require an adjournment. Considering the seriousness of the breach, absence of good reason, lack of promptness, prejudice arising from loss of finality, and weak merits, retrospective extension of time was refused.

The judgment concerns an application for retrospective permission to file an appellant’s notice out of time. The proposed appeal was from an order made after trial by His Honour Judge Sephton KC, but the application for an extension of time was refused by the High Court.