Ildar Uzbekov v Revolut Limited

A claimant is not entitled as of right to have a breach of contract claim determined merely because nominal damages are available. The court may strike out such a claim as an abuse of process where the litigation would impose disproportionate costs and consume judicial resources for little objective benefit.

Declaratory relief is discretionary. Whether it would serve a useful purpose is a prime consideration and must be assessed objectively by reference to the declaration pleaded. Subjective satisfaction, reputational concerns that the declaration would not resolve, and general public interest arguments will not ordinarily suffice.

The claimant alleged that Revolut breached its contractual terms by blocking and closing his account and returning funds to a payer. He accepted that he had suffered no compensable financial loss, but sought nominal damages and declarations concerning Revolut’s contractual right to act as it did.

Revolut accepted that factual issues concerning breach were triable. It applied for reverse summary judgment under CPR 24.3, alternatively strike-out under CPR 3.4(2)(a) and (b), contending that the declaration would serve no useful purpose and that the proceedings were disproportionate and abusive.

The issues were whether there was a real prospect of declaratory relief and whether the claim should be struck out as an abuse of process.

1. Nominal damages and access to adjudication. The fact that loss is small does not itself justify refusing to determine a claim. Since the CPR were introduced, however, a claimant alleging a wrong actionable per se is not entitled to adjudication as of right. The court must protect its resources, the defendant and other litigants from disproportionate litigation.
2. Abuse of process. The approach in Jameel v Dow Jones & Co Inc. applies beyond defamation. In a claim limited to nominal damages, the court may ask whether the litigation is worth the candle. If the costs and use of court resources would be disproportionate to the objective benefit obtainable, strike-out may follow under CPR 3.4(2)(b).
3. Declaratory relief. The jurisdiction is discretionary. The question whether the declaration would serve a useful purpose is a prime consideration, assessed objectively. The factors identified in Financial Services Authority v Rourke are not a statutory or exhaustive checklist. The court must assess the declaration actually pleaded, rather than a different declaration that might follow from evidence at trial.
4. Application. The claim was backward-looking because the parties’ relationship had ended. A declaration would not determine the truth of the underlying money-laundering allegations, bind other banks, or materially vindicate the claimant’s reputation. Defamation proceedings and regulatory or ombudsman mechanisms provided more appropriate routes for the wider concerns advanced.
5. The pleadings and evidence made the utility of the relief sufficiently clear at the interlocutory stage. Even an egregious breach would confer only marginal objective benefit compared with the claimed costs and demands on court resources. There was no real prospect of declaratory relief, and the Particulars of Claim were struck out as an abuse of process under CPR 3.4(2)(b). The court invited representations on the precise form of order.