Rohit Sharma v University of Nottingham

Courts and tribunals must make reasonable adjustments to alleviate substantial disadvantage caused by disability in participation in proceedings. The duty arises from the common law duty of fairness, because the statutory duty in the Equality Act 2010 does not apply to judicial functions. Adjustments must be reasonable and assessed in the light of the circumstances existing when the hearing takes place. An appellate tribunal need not prescribe detailed arrangements many months in advance where the proposed adjustments are based on a misunderstanding of the hearing, are unnecessary, or are premature. Practical matters may be addressed nearer the hearing if a genuine need emerges.

The appellant brought employment claims against the respondent, including claims for unfair dismissal and discrimination, which were struck out by the Employment Tribunal after he was found to have conducted the proceedings unreasonably and no longer to be actively pursuing them. The Employment Appeal Tribunal listed his appeal for a one-day hearing and refused, without a hearing, his extensive application for disability-related adjustments.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal, alleging breaches of sections 20 and 21 of the Equality Act 2010, Article 6 of the ECHR and the Judicial College Equal Treatment Bench Book 2024. The central issue was whether the EAT had been wrong to refuse to order the requested adjustments at that stage.

1. Appeal dismissed. The EAT was entitled to refuse the requested adjustments because the application proceeded on a fundamental misunderstanding. The EAT appeal concerned only whether the Employment Tribunal had been wrong to strike out the surviving employment claims. It would involve documents and submissions, with no live evidence or cross-examination, and was listed for one day.
2. The statutory duty in sections 20 and 21 of the Equality Act 2010 is not imposed on courts or tribunals when exercising a judicial function. Section 29 does not apply because of Schedule 3, paragraph 3. This was consistent with J v K (EHRC intervening) [2019] EWCA Civ 5, para 33, and Heal v University of Oxford [2020] ICR 1294, para 18.
3. That statutory exclusion has little practical significance in this case. The common law duty of fairness requires a court or tribunal to take disability into account and to make reasonable adjustments where disability causes substantial disadvantage in participating in proceedings. Articles 6 and 14 of the ECHR add nothing of substance to that duty: J v K (EHRC intervening) [2019] EWCA Civ 5, para 36; Heal v University of Oxford [2020] ICR 1294, para 20; and Galo v Bombardier Aerospace UK [2016] NICA 25, paras 47–51.
4. Reasonableness is central. The court should not make detailed procedural provision many months before the hearing where the need is not established, the requested measure is unnecessary, or the request is premature. The EAT could properly leave the frequency of breaks and arrangements for a quiet waiting area to the good sense of the tribunal at the hearing. Support from the appellant’s wife, son or a McKenzie friend, and the use of prepared notes, required no advance order. The appellant could seek permission to use assistive technology if a genuine need emerged, subject to any issue concerning recording under section 9 of the Contempt of Court Act 1981.
5. The appellant could not choose the ethnicity of the tribunal. The EAT was also entitled to conclude that speech-to-text software, screen readers and text magnification had not been justified on the material before it. The appeal was dismissed.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal from the EAT dismissed. The refusal to order the requested reasonable adjustments in advance was upheld.
• Employment Appeal Tribunal: Judge Beard refused, without a hearing, the application for extensive procedural adjustments. The appeal was listed for a one-day full hearing.
• Employment Tribunal: Employment Judge Broughton struck out the surviving claims in a judgment dated 29 August 2024, because the appellant had conducted the proceedings unreasonably and was no longer actively pursuing them.