E (a child), Re

A witness of fact generally has no legitimate ground of appeal against adverse findings where the criticisms were fairly put in cross-examination and the witness had an opportunity to respond. There is no automatic right to intervene or obtain legal representation merely because adverse findings may be made. Article 6 does not ordinarily apply where the judgment determines no civil rights or obligations of the witness, but serious adverse findings in an authoritative judgment may engage Article 8. Under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, a timely objection based on unfairness must be considered. The exceptional approach in Re W was confined to findings not raised during the hearing and appearing unexpectedly in the judgment. A claimed chilling effect on professionals requires compelling evidence and argument.

These were applications by Aimee Dover, a psychotherapist and witness in private Children Act proceedings concerning E, a child. The Family Court made adverse findings about her professional conduct in a judgment handed down on 2 May 2025. On 16 July 2025, the judge decided that the judgment should be disclosed to Ms Dover’s regulator and employers and published naming her.

Ms Dover applied in time for permission to challenge the naming decision. She also sought an extension of time, permission to amend her appellant’s notice and permission to challenge the underlying findings. She relied on procedural fairness, the merits of the findings, Article 8 and an alleged chilling effect on other professionals. The central questions were whether a witness could appeal adverse findings and whether the judgment should be published without identifying her.

1. Outcome. Permission to appeal was refused and the other applications were dismissed. The reporting restriction order was discharged, and the judgment was directed to be citable.
2. Convention rights. Reliance on Article 6 was misplaced because the judgment determined no civil rights or obligations of Ms Dover. Serious adverse findings in an authoritative judicial ruling may nevertheless interfere with Article 8. If findings were reached through an unfair process, publication may be unjustified. Under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, a timely objection must be considered, and a well-founded complaint may lead to the findings being quashed or revisited, publication being withheld, or a combination of those remedies.
3. New points on appeal. Applying Notting Hill Finance v Sheikh [2019] EWCA Civ 1337, the court would generally refuse new points requiring factual investigation or whose introduction would unfairly prejudice the respondents. The fairness, Article 8 and chilling-effect arguments could and should have been raised below. Ms Dover had opportunities to do so and her representations implicitly accepted the findings.
4. Fairness and intervention. Re W (A Child) [2016] EWCA Civ 1140 was exceptional. It concerned highly adverse findings which had not featured in any party’s case or been raised during the hearing. Here, the criticisms were put to Ms Dover in evidence and cross-examination, and she had a fair opportunity to respond. A witness at risk of adverse findings therefore has no automatic right to intervene or legal representation.
5. Other grounds. The alleged chilling effect was an unsupported class claim requiring compelling evidence and argument, as illustrated by Re Ward (A Child) [2010] EWHC 16 (Fam) and Abbasi v Newcastle upon Tyne NHS Trust [2025] UKSC 15. The court doubted that it had jurisdiction to entertain a witness’s appeal against findings of fact outside the exceptional Re W circumstances. In any event, the challenge was out of time. Applying the Denton principles through R (Hysaj) v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1633, and applying the same approach to a litigant in person as recognised in Lakatamia v SU [2019] EWCA Civ 1626, the delay was serious and significant, the reasons were unpersuasive and an extension was not in the interests of justice. The professional-conduct findings also had a clear and sufficient connection with the welfare issue and were not shown to apply an excessively demanding standard.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): On 2 December 2025, refused permission to appeal and dismissed the applications for an extension of time and amendment.
• Family Court: Ms Justice Henke handed down the fact-finding judgment on 2 May 2025 and a reserved judgment on 16 July 2025. She directed disclosure to the regulator and employers and publication naming Ms Dover.