R v GBE

On an Attorney General’s reference, the Court of Appeal held that a sentencing judge may reflect prolonged coercive and controlling behaviour in the sentence for that offence while taking account of mitigation, including delay, family responsibilities, employment and the absence of a previous custodial sentence. The appropriate reduction for delay is fact-specific. A reduction of more than 40 per cent from a notional sentence of three years and four months to two years, followed by suspension, was unduly lenient. Nevertheless, the court exercised its discretion not to increase the sentence because of post-sentence progress and changed personal circumstances.

The respondent was convicted at Lewes Crown Court of assault occasioning actual bodily harm, contrary to section 47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861, and controlling or coercive behaviour, contrary to section 76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015. He had been acquitted of three rape counts. The trial judge imposed concurrent two-year suspended sentences with unpaid work and rehabilitation requirements, after reducing a notional sentence of about three years and four months to reflect delay and the effect on the children.

The Solicitor General referred the sentence under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, arguing that the notional sentence was too low and that the reduction was excessive. The issues were whether the notional sentence was adequate, whether the reduction made the sentence unduly lenient, and whether the court should increase it after that finding.

1. Reference allowed, but sentence not increased. The court held that the judge was entitled to arrive at an overall notional sentence of about three years and four months. The judge could reflect all the offending in the sentence for controlling and coercive behaviour and take account of the available mitigation.

2. The relevant mitigation included the five-year delay since the offending, the respondent’s work, continued financial support for his first child, his new relationship and child, assistance given to his mother, and the fact that an immediate custodial sentence would have been his first. Those matters were relevant to sentencing, but they did not justify the reduction from three years and four months to two years.

3. The court considered Timpson [2023] EWCA Crim 453 and later authorities. It explained that the extent of any reduction for delay is fact-specific. In the circumstances of the present case, the reduction exceeded 40 per cent and was not merely lenient; it was unduly lenient.

4. Having made that finding, the court accepted that it had a discretion not to increase the sentence. It exercised that discretion because of the recent probation report showing progress and engagement, partial completion of the sentence requirements, further evidence concerning the respondent’s mother’s illness, and changed family circumstances during the five-year period.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On a reference under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, the court held the sentence unduly lenient but exercised its discretion not to increase it.
• Lewes Crown Court: The respondent was convicted of assault occasioning actual bodily harm and controlling or coercive behaviour and sentenced on 2 May 2025 to concurrent two-year terms of imprisonment suspended for two years, with requirements for unpaid work and rehabilitation activity.