R v Aaron Miah

For sentencing a person who was 17 when offending, the court must apply the youth sentencing framework and assess whether custody is necessary, taking account of age, mitigation and rehabilitation. Non-fatal strangulation is inherently serious and does not require proof of injury. The sentence must also be assessed in its practical effect. Where custody, licence conditions and post-sentence supervision have already fulfilled the purposes of sentencing, further conditions may be inexpedient. In such unusual circumstances, a conditional discharge may replace detention under the Sentencing Act 2020.

This was an appeal against sentence brought with leave of the single judge. The appellant, aged 17 when he offended, pleaded guilty to intentional non-fatal strangulation, assault by beating and criminal damage. On 11 September 2024, the Crown Court at Reading (HHJ Turner, T20230033) imposed nine months’ detention for strangulation, with concurrent shorter terms for the other offences.

The appellant challenged the use and length of detention, arguing that the youth sentencing guidelines and his significant personal mitigation had not been properly applied. He also relied on the practical effect of time spent in custody, on licence and under post-sentence supervision. The central issues were whether the detention sentence was wrong in principle or manifestly excessive, and whether a different order should now be substituted.

1. Appeal allowed. The original sentencing decision contained no error of principle in treating the offending as sufficiently serious to cross the custody threshold.
2. Non-fatal strangulation is a serious offence. The act creates a real and justified fear of death and inherent harm, so proof of injury is unnecessary. The circumstances here, including the domestic setting, threats, use of force and concurrent offences, supported the conclusion that detention was appropriate: Cook [2023] EWCA Crim 452, applied.
3. The judge expressly had regard to the overarching guidelines for sentencing children and young people. A judge need not quote their general principles where the reasoning shows that they were considered. The judge considered a community penalty, the appellant’s age, mitigation and mental health difficulties. Under section 25 of the Sentencing Act 2020, remittal of a youth to the Youth Court is subject to the exception that it would be undesirable; where detention is necessary because of the seriousness of the offending, remittal is plainly undesirable.
4. The sentence was not manifestly excessive in principle. The judge applied the contemporary guidance in Cook, made a substantial reduction for mitigation and reduced the sentence by one-third to reflect the appellant’s age at the time of offending.
5. However, the practical effect of the sentence was decisive. The appellant had spent 10 months in custody, equivalent to a 20-month sentence, followed by four and a half months on licence and a further period of post-sentence supervision. In the unusual circumstances, further post-sentence conditions would serve none of the purposes of sentencing. Applying section 80(4) of the Sentencing Act 2020 and the approach in Dawes [2019] EWCA Crim 848, it was inexpedient to inflict further punishment.
6. The detention sentences were quashed. Concurrent conditional discharges for two years were substituted on each count, and the surcharge was reduced to £20.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 8 July 2025, allowed the appeal, quashed the detention sentences and substituted concurrent two-year conditional discharges, with a consequential alteration to the surcharge.
2. Crown Court at Reading (HHJ Turner, T20230033): On 11 September 2024, sentenced the appellant to nine months’ detention for intentional non-fatal strangulation, with concurrent terms for assault by beating and criminal damage.