R v Kyle Woods

When sentencing for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to resist or prevent apprehension, the court may have regard to the guideline for section 18 offences involving an intention to cause really serious harm, although that guideline is not directly applicable. The distinction between an intention to evade arrest and an intention to cause really serious harm is fact-sensitive. A highly dangerous attempt to drive a large vehicle through a confined space close to a police officer may involve both an intention to evade arrest and a high degree of recklessness. Those factors may produce culpability not substantially different from an intention to cause really serious harm. Personal mitigation may carry limited weight where the offence is very serious and the victim’s injuries are grave. Sentencing authorities are fact-specific unless they are guideline cases.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Manchester to dangerous driving and to causing grievous bodily harm with intent to resist or prevent his apprehension. He drove a van towards a police officer who was attempting to stop him, struck the officer and drove over him, causing serious injuries.

The appellant received six years and four months’ imprisonment for the grievous bodily harm offence, with no separate penalty for dangerous driving. He appealed with leave, arguing that the pre-mitigation sentence was too high and that insufficient allowance had been made for the absence of an intention to cause really serious harm and for his personal circumstances. The central issue was whether the sentence was manifestly excessive.

1. Appeal dismissed. The sentence of six years and four months’ imprisonment was not manifestly excessive.
2. The authorities relied on below were not guideline cases. Their outcomes were fact-specific. They nevertheless provided context for the sentencing exercise. The court had some regard to the section 18 guideline for offences involving an intention to cause really serious harm, although that was not the offence for which the appellant was sentenced.
3. If the appellant had intended to cause really serious harm to a police officer using a large van, a sentence in double figures before mitigation would have been open. The distinction between intending to avoid arrest and intending to cause really serious harm depends on the circumstances.
4. Here, the appellant drove a large vehicle through a small gap in very close proximity to an officer who was trying to stop him. The manoeuvre was highly dangerous and involved a very high risk of very serious injury. The conduct combined an intention to evade arrest with a high degree of recklessness. That combination was not very different in culpability from an intention to cause really serious harm.
5. The sentencing judge had properly taken account of the absence of such an intention, the appellant’s personal mitigation, the culpability and harm factors, and the aggravating features, including the victim’s status as a police officer, the appellant’s relevant convictions and his being subject to a community order. Personal circumstances had limited mitigating weight given the seriousness of the offence and its consequences for the victim.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On appeal from the Crown Court at Manchester, the court dismissed the appeal and upheld the sentence of six years and four months’ imprisonment.
• Crown Court at Manchester: The appellant was sentenced on 6 December 2024 to six years and four months’ imprisonment for causing grievous bodily harm with intent to resist or prevent his apprehension. No separate penalty was imposed for dangerous driving.