R v Gemma Brogan

On a sentence reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission, the court must identify new legal argument or information and a real possibility that the sentence would not be upheld. The process is not a rehearing of earlier grounds. Fresh evidence must satisfy the statutory reception criteria and afford a ground for allowing the appeal. A mental disorder must be considered, but reduced culpability requires a sufficient connection between the disorder and the offending. A diagnosis or psychological vulnerability does not itself make a sentence manifestly excessive. Prolonged and extraordinarily serious neglect justified the six-year sentence.

The appellant was convicted of seven offences contrary to section 1(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, relating to the prolonged neglect of seven children. On 4 November 2022, the Crown Court at Lewes imposed six years’ imprisonment on each count, concurrently, following guilty pleas. Leave to appeal was refused by a single judge on 17 February 2023, and no renewal application was made. The Criminal Cases Review Commission later referred the sentence on new mental-health evidence. The central issue was whether that evidence provided a good ground for concluding that the sentence was manifestly excessive.

Outcome. The court dismissed the appeal against sentence. The reporting restrictions protecting the identification of the seven under-18 victims were reaffirmed under section 45 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999.

1. CCRC gateway. Under section 13 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1995, the CCRC could refer the sentence only where new legal argument or information, not previously raised, created a real possibility that the sentence would not be upheld, subject to exceptional circumstances. A CCRC application was not an opportunity to rerun grounds advanced at trial or on the original appeal.
2. Fresh evidence. The new evidence satisfied the requirements concerning capability of belief, admissibility and the explanation for its earlier absence under section 23(2) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968. It did not, however, afford a ground for allowing the appeal. The evidence therefore did not establish that the sentence was manifestly excessive.
3. Mental disorder and culpability. The Sentencing Council guideline on offenders with mental disorders had to be followed by virtue of section 59(1) of the Sentencing Act 2020. A disorder must always be considered, but it will not necessarily affect sentence. Reduced culpability requires a sufficient connection between the disorder and the offending behaviour.
4. Application. The appellant’s anxiety had been before the sentencing judge. The later evidence identified a mild to moderate personality disorder but showed no sufficient connection with the offending. The offending extended over more than 20 months, followed interventions by the school and social services, and involved extraordinary neglect of seven children. The categorisation as harm level 1 and culpability category A, movement to the top of the four-to-eight-year range, and 25 per cent credit for the guilty plea did not produce a manifestly excessive sentence. Six years’ imprisonment was entirely justified.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 30 September 2025, dismissed the appeal against sentence following a reference by the Criminal Cases Review Commission.
2. Criminal Cases Review Commission: Referred the sentence on the basis of new mental-health evidence.
3. Single judge of the Court of Appeal: Refused leave to appeal on 17 February 2023. The appellant did not renew the application.
4. Crown Court at Lewes: On 4 November 2022, sentenced the appellant to six years’ imprisonment on each of seven counts, concurrent.