R v Maddison Marie Barrett

When exceptional circumstances justify departure from a statutory minimum sentence for firearm possession, the court must consider a reduction from the guideline starting point which reflects the deterrent inflation built into the minimum. That reduction is separate from ordinary mitigation and varies with the circumstances. Possession of a lethal firearm remains a grave offence.

Guidance referring to an alternative sentencing table is permissive. Harm is assessed by risk, including location, the number and vulnerability of people exposed, and the weapon’s accessibility and visibility. Statutory credit applies to qualifying curfew; non-qualifying curfew may be recognised only through discretionary sentence reduction.

The appellant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Harrow to possessing a prohibited firearm and ammunition without a firearms certificate. She was acquitted on a directed verdict of possessing a firearm with intent to endanger life. On 13 June 2025 she received a total sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment.

With leave, she appealed against sentence. She challenged the categorisation of harm, the treatment of exceptional circumstances, the distinction between her position and that of her co-defendant, and the calculation of curfew credit. The central issues were whether the guideline required use of Table 2 after a finding of exceptional circumstances and whether a further reduction from the Table 1 starting point was required.

1. The sentence appeal was allowed. The Court upheld the Recorder’s categorisation of harm and her decision to sentence by reference to Table 1, but found that she had omitted a reduction required by the finding of exceptional circumstances.
2. In applying the Sentencing Council guideline, harm was properly assessed by reference to the risk of harm or disorder and actual alarm or distress. Relevant considerations included the location of the offence, the number and vulnerability of people exposed, especially children, and the accessibility and visibility of the weapon. The Recorder had considered those matters and was best placed to categorise the harm. The categorisation as Category 2 was not shown to be erroneous.
3. The guidance that a court may find it useful to refer to culpability A of Table 2 where exceptional circumstances are found was permissive. It did not require the court to use Table 2. The Recorder had given cogent reasons for retaining Table 1 and had sufficiently distinguished the appellant’s position from that of her co-defendant.
4. The Court applied the principle discussed in Rehman [2005] EWCA Crim 2056 and Otero [2023] EWCA Crim 981, and supported by Luke Smith [2024] EWCA Crim 424. The Table 1 starting point reflects, in part, the deterrent rationale for the five-year minimum under section 311 of Schedule 20 to the Sentencing Act 2020. Once exceptional circumstances are found, that inflationary element is disconnected. The court must therefore consider some reduction from the starting point independently of ordinary mitigation. The amount depends on the circumstances, while possession of a lethal firearm remains grave.
5. The Recorder had intended to recognise the appellant’s 75 days on a non-qualifying doorstep curfew, but that time did not attract statutory credit. The Court reduced the sentence by one month to give effect to that intention. The notional sentence after trial was three and a half years; applying the 15 per cent guilty-plea discount produced 35 months, reduced to 34 months. The 46-month sentence was quashed and replaced with 34 months’ imprisonment. The appellant was entitled to 324 days’ credit for 647 days on qualifying curfew under section 325 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

1. Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): allowed the sentence appeal, quashed the 46-month sentence and substituted 34 months’ imprisonment.
2. Crown Court at Harrow: following the guilty pleas and acquittal on the intent-to-endanger-life count, imposed a total sentence of 46 months’ imprisonment on 13 June 2025.