R v Paul Harris & Ors

A court’s decision not to adjourn a criminal trial ordinarily means that the trial must proceed. A judge cannot convert that decision into a terminating ruling by declaration. Under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a ruling becomes terminating only when the prosecution undertakes that the defendant will be acquitted if its appeal fails. The absence of prosecution witnesses does not necessarily make a fair trial impossible. Relevant parts of their statements may be read, with a fairness-based stay available if necessary. “Limb 1” and “Limb 2” abuse arguments address distinct concerns. The appeal was allowed and the termination quashed.

The King appealed from a terminating ruling made by His Honour Judge Meegan at Shrewsbury Crown Court in the prosecution of four defendants arising from alleged street violence in 2019. The trial had been repeatedly listed in warned lists before being fixed for August 2025. Two independent prosecution witnesses were absent, and the prosecution abandoned reliance on their evidence.

The judge rejected abuse-of-process applications, refused to adjourn the trial, and treated that refusal as a terminating ruling. The prosecution appealed, arguing that the trial should proceed or, alternatively, that it should be adjourned. The central issues were whether a fair trial was possible without the absent witnesses and whether the judge could characterise the refusal to adjourn as a terminating ruling.

The appeal was allowed. The decision terminating the proceedings was quashed. The error lay in treating the refusal to adjourn as a terminating ruling, not in refusing the adjournment itself.

1. The prosecution had failed in its duty to make the two independent witnesses available. One witness could potentially have been brought by warrant or enabled to give evidence remotely. The other’s unavailability had been communicated too late. Nevertheless, a fair trial was possible. Relevant parts of the witnesses’ statements could be read. If necessary, the defence could read them as part of its case. A stay on fairness grounds would only have been required if the absence caused irremediable prejudice to an affected defendant.
2. The judge was right to distinguish the two forms of abuse of process. “Limb 1” concerns a stay because a fair trial cannot take place. “Limb 2” concerns a stay because, although the trial would be fair, continuing it would affront the integrity of the criminal justice system for another reason. The applications had relied on Limb 2, and the judge was correct to reject them. The distinction was explained in R v Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court, ex p Bennett [1994] 1 AC 42.
3. The usual consequence of refusing an adjournment is that the trial proceeds. Under section 58 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, a ruling becomes terminating only if the prosecution undertakes that the defendant will be acquitted if any appeal fails. The court has no part in making that election, apart from managing the time needed for it. The judge’s declaration was therefore legally wrong and unreasonable. This court could reverse it under section 67 of the Act.
4. The guidance in R v Ng and another [2024] EWCA Crim 493 arose in the different context of an absent prosecuting advocate, where requiring the case to proceed could only lead to a not-guilty verdict under section 17 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967. It did not require termination where a fair jury trial remained possible.

The court added that, if a later adjournment application had been made, options such as evidence being given out of turn, bail to return for sentence, and appropriate jury directions could have been considered. It also gave obiter guidance on warned lists, recommending realistic listing windows, fixed dates for cases not reached, active pre-trial review, and careful prioritisation.

• Crown Court at Shrewsbury: His Honour Judge Meegan rejected the abuse-of-process applications, refused a further adjournment, and treated the refusal as a terminating ruling.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The appeal was allowed. The terminating ruling was quashed and directions were given for the trial to take place at a different venue.