George Webb & Anor v R

Under section 1(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, servitude requires the coerced provision of work or services. Benefits obtained by a defendant cannot, without such provision, amount to servitude. The provision creates one offence, capable of being committed through slavery, servitude, or both, so a Brown direction is not ordinarily required. Slavery is not confined to legal ownership or classic chattel slavery. It concerns coercive domination which deprives the victim of real personal autonomy and important freedoms for a sufficient period. Jury directions must identify the conduct relied on and its effect on the victim. Convictions were unsafe because the jury could have relied on servitude without evidence of work or services and was inadequately directed on slavery.

George Webb and Sarah Somerset-How were convicted at the Crown Court at Portsmouth of holding Thomas Somerset-How in slavery or servitude, contrary to section 1(1)(a) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015. They were also convicted of offences involving ill-treatment by a care worker. Thomas Somerset-How, who had cerebral palsy and required substantial care, had not performed work or services for the appellants. The prosecution alleged that coercive control enabled Webb to retain his caring employment and enabled both appellants to use the victim’s home and resources.

The appeals concerned the meaning of slavery and servitude, whether section 1(1)(a) created one offence or two, whether a Brown direction was required, the safety of the convictions, sentence, and whether a retrial should be ordered.

The convictions on count 1 were quashed. The applications for leave to appeal against the sentences on the surviving convictions were dismissed. No retrial was ordered.

1. Servitude. The court followed the approach in R v K [2011] EWCA Crim 1691 and took account of Siliadin v France (2006) 43 EHRR 16. Servitude requires an obligation to provide work or services imposed by coercion, linked with the additional requirements that the victim cannot decide where to live and has no prospect of changing the condition. Thomas Somerset-How had provided no work or services. The trial judge therefore misdirected the jury by leaving servitude as a possible basis of conviction.
2. Statutory interaction. Sections 3(5) and 3(6) of the Modern Slavery Act 2015, applied through section 1(4)(b), did not enlarge the meaning of servitude. They could not convert the provision of benefits, or enabling the acquisition of benefits, into work or services where none was provided. The penal nature of the legislation reinforced that conclusion.
3. Single offence and jury unanimity. Section 1(1)(a) created one offence involving closely related concepts which could be committed through slavery, servitude, or both. The court followed R v Chilvers [2021] EWCA Crim 1311: a Brown direction was required only in limited circumstances, such as materially different factual bases, distinct events, or different means giving rise to different defences. No such direction was required here.
4. Slavery. The classic ownership-based definition was inadequate as the sole direction for a modern domestic offence. Slavery involved domination of the victim’s life through coercive or controlling behaviour, depriving the victim of real personal autonomy and important freedoms. The jury direction should identify the conduct relied on and ask whether it reduced the victim’s autonomy to such an extent and for such a period that the victim was held in slavery. The evidence could support that conclusion, but it was not overwhelming, and the direction given was inadequate.
5. Retrial and sentence. The remaining nine-year sentences were not manifestly excessive. Applying section 7 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, the interests of justice did not require a retrial: the surviving convictions and sentences covered the criminality, the slavery evidence was not overwhelming, and the prosecution had had a full opportunity to assist the trial judge on the novel legal issues.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) quashed the convictions for holding a person in slavery or servitude, dismissed the applications for leave to appeal against the surviving sentences, and declined to order a retrial.
• Crown Court at Portsmouth convicted both appellants on count 1 and other offences. It imposed 11 years’ imprisonment on count 1, concurrent with nine years imposed for the other offences.