R v Michael Jordan

A court may make a sexual harm prevention order on conviction only where the statutory gateway in section 103A is met, including that the defendant is dealt with for an offence listed in Schedule 3 or 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Breach of an existing SHPO is not a listed offence. A later sentencing court therefore has no power to impose a fresh SHPO for that breach. An order made in those circumstances cannot be treated as a variation unless the statutory variation procedure has been engaged by an authorised applicant. Where no such application was made, the order is unlawful and may be quashed, even after substantial delay, if the interests of justice require it.

The applicant had previously been made subject to an SHPO. In 2020, after convictions including two breaches of that order, the Crown Court imposed a further indefinite SHPO. In 2025, following pleas to breaches of the 2020 order, the Crown Court at Huntingdon noted that the order appeared unlawful. The applicant sought an extension of 1,743 days to appeal against the 2020 order. The central issue was whether the sentencing court had power to impose a new SHPO, or whether the order could instead be treated as a variation of the earlier order.

Appeal allowed. The court granted the extension of time and quashed the SHPO imposed in 2020.

1. At the material time, section 103A of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 permitted a court to make an SHPO where the statutory conditions were met. These included that the defendant was dealt with for an offence listed in Schedule 3 or Schedule 5, together with the necessary protective assessment.
2. Breach of an existing SHPO is not an offence listed in either schedule. A defendant’s conviction for breaching an SHPO therefore does not give the sentencing court power to impose a new SHPO. The same principle applies where the earlier order was a Sexual Offences Prevention Order, the predecessor of an SHPO.
3. The court applied the reasoning in R v MT [2023] EWCA Crim 531, where a new SHPO imposed following breach of a SOPO was unlawful and had to be quashed. It also followed R v Wilkes [2022] EWCA Crim 525, which demonstrated that no different approach applies to breach of an SHPO.
4. Section 103E provides a statutory mechanism for varying an SHPO and identifies the persons who may apply. No application by a relevant chief officer of police had been made in relation to the earlier order. The 2020 order therefore could not be treated as a lawful variation.
5. In the interests of justice, the lengthy extension of time was granted and the 2020 SHPO was quashed. The relevant chief constable could consider whether to seek reimposition of an SHPO under section 103A.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 4 November 2025 granted an extension of 1,743 days and quashed the SHPO imposed in 2020.
• Crown Court at Huntingdon: On 4 June 2025, when the applicant was committed for sentence following pleas to breaches of the 2020 SHPO, the court noted that the order appeared unlawful.
• Crown Court at Cambridge: On 18 August 2020 imposed a suspended sentence and a further indefinite SHPO after convictions for breaching an existing SHPO.