R v Keaton Muldoon

On a reference against an allegedly unduly lenient sentence, the sentence must fall outside the range that the first-instance judge might reasonably consider appropriate. Leave should be granted only in a non-borderline case involving gross error. The Court of Appeal should respect factual findings made by a trial judge unless they lack a factual foundation, are internally inconsistent, conflict with incontrovertible facts or are irrational. The culpability A factor requiring a deliberate decision to ignore road rules and disregard risk requires more than a literal or minor breach. Its application is fact-sensitive. Sentencing categorisation remains an evaluative exercise in which the trial judge’s advantage from hearing the evidence is important.

The Attorney General sought leave under section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 to refer a sentence imposed by the Crown Court at Derby as unduly lenient. Following acquittals on murder and attempted murder charges, the respondent had pleaded guilty to causing death by dangerous driving, causing serious injury by dangerous driving and driving while disqualified. He received an overall sentence of five years and three months’ imprisonment. The Attorney General argued that the offending belonged in culpability category A rather than category B under the applicable dangerous-driving guideline. The central issue was whether the sentencing judge’s categorisation involved the gross error required for intervention.

Leave to refer was refused, and the reference was refused.

1. Section 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 is directed to sentences that are outside the range which the first-instance judge might consider appropriate. Leave should be granted only in cases that are not borderline. The jurisdiction addresses gross error.
2. An appellate court should not interfere with a trial judge’s factual findings unless they lack a factual foundation, are internally inconsistent, conflict with incontrovertible facts or are irrational. The judge had heard four weeks of evidence, considered the expert material and made careful findings after taking account of the jury’s acquittals.
3. The judge’s advantage in assessing the facts extended to assessing culpability. He was entitled to reject category C and category A and place the offending in category B. His findings did not establish a prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of dangerous driving or an obviously highly dangerous manoeuvre.
4. The category A factor concerning a deliberate decision to ignore road rules and disregard the risk of danger to others required more than a literal reading which could encompass modest speeding. The examples given by the Court included racing, deliberately driving on the wrong side of the road and reversing for a substantial period on a main road. Each case depended on its facts. The findings concerning speed, proximity and the final manoeuvre did not establish that factor.
5. The Court would not substitute its own assessment for the sentencing judge’s considered categorisation. The sentence was not shown to be unduly lenient.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): On 18 November 2025, the Court refused leave for the Attorney General’s reference and refused the reference.
• Crown Court at Derby: The respondent was sentenced to an overall term of five years and three months’ imprisonment for causing death by dangerous driving, causing serious injury by dangerous driving and driving while disqualified.