R v Jake Vesey

A conviction is not unsafe merely because a juror has engaged in misconduct. The irregularity must show either juror bias or acquisition of information which ought not to have been available to the jury and which materially affects the safety of the conviction. Evidence offered to establish the irregularity may be refused under Criminal Appeal Act 1968, section 23, where it is not capable of belief or would not afford a ground for allowing the appeal. The court refused leave to appeal because there was no foundation for concluding that the conviction was unsafe.

The applicant was convicted of robbery at Manchester Minshull Street Crown Court on 9 July 2020 and sentenced to an extended determinate sentence of nine years. During the trial, a juror spoke twice to the applicant’s former girlfriend, Ms Chaisty. The alleged conversations concerned the applicant’s relationship with her, his previous convictions, his imprisonment and what the juror intended to say in deliberations.

The juror was later prosecuted under section 20A of the Juries Act 1974. The applicant sought leave to appeal on the ground that the jury irregularity rendered the conviction unsafe. He also sought to adduce Ms Chaisty’s 2020 witness statement and an extension of time. The central issue was whether the irregularity demonstrated bias or possession of information capable of making the conviction unsafe.

1. Application refused. The court found no foundation for concluding that the robbery conviction was unsafe and refused leave to appeal. It declined to receive Ms Chaisty’s statement under section 23 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, because the statement did not appear capable of belief and did not afford a ground for allowing the appeal. It was unnecessary to determine the application for an extension of time.
2. The existence of conversations between a juror and a witness during the trial did not itself make the conviction unsafe. Under section 2 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968, the relevant question was whether the conversations showed that the juror was biased or had acquired information, through research or otherwise, which he ought not to have had. Not every juror irregularity leads to the conclusion that a conviction is unsafe.
3. Even accepting the initial account in the 2020 statement, the juror’s apparent information was that the applicant had no previous convictions, which was incorrect, and that he was on remand. That information was not materially prejudicial. The applicant’s relationship with Ms Chaisty was not central to the issues before the jury, and forensic evidence linked him to the phone and cap left at the scene.
4. The court also considered Ms Chaisty’s later evidence that she had been encouraged or forced to make the 2020 statement after the conviction. Her inability to recall the conversation after five years was not held against the applicant, but her later evidence provided a further reason to doubt the reliability of the statement.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): The full court refused leave to appeal against the conviction under Criminal Appeal Act 1968. It declined to receive the further statement and left the Crown Court conviction undisturbed. The application for an extension of time was not determined because the merits were insufficient.