R v Alice Wood

On a renewed application for leave to appeal, the Court of Appeal confirmed that expert evidence may address the factual assumptions relevant to an opinion without usurping the jury’s function. Re-examination is permissible where it arises from cross-examination. A submission of no case to answer must be assessed under the Galbraith test: evidence capable of supporting a conviction by a properly directed jury must be left to the jury, unless it is tenuous or inherently weak. Fresh grounds advanced after refusal of leave require particularly cogent justification. Fresh evidence must be capable of belief and sufficiently capable of affecting the safety of the conviction. Counsel’s tactical decisions fall within legitimate professional judgment unless outside the reasonable range. In sentencing for murder, Schedule 21 requires a fact-specific assessment of the starting point and aggravating and mitigating features. A vehicle may be treated as a weapon equivalent, and no threshold of significant suffering is required for suffering to aggravate sentence.

After a two-week trial at Chester Crown Court, Alice Wood was convicted of murdering her fiancé, Ryan Watson, and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 18 years, less 616 days spent on remand. The trial involved CCTV evidence, expert evidence about perception response time, and competing accounts of whether the fatal collision was deliberate or accidental.

Following refusal by a single judge, the applicant renewed her applications for an extension of time, leave to appeal conviction and sentence, permission to add a fresh ground, and permission to rely on medical records concerning the deceased’s historic mental-health difficulties. The central issues were the admissibility and scope of expert evidence, whether there was a case to answer, the adequacy of the fresh evidence and proposed ground, the treatment of counsel’s tactical decision, and whether the minimum term was excessive.

1. Extension of time and conviction. The 49-day delay was excused, but the renewed application for leave to appeal conviction was refused. The proposed challenge to re-examination of the prosecution collision expert was unarguable. The question arose from cross-examination and properly clarified whether perception response time remained relevant after the deceased had just been thrown from the car. The jury remained responsible for deciding the facts, including whether the applicant had been looking forwards.
2. Expert evidence is governed by common-law principles and section 78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. The trial judge acted within the discretion to exclude evidence on fairness grounds. The evidence did not trespass on the jury’s role.
3. Under R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039, where prosecution evidence taken at its highest could support conviction by a properly directed jury, the case must be left to the jury. Withdrawal is appropriate only where the evidence is tenuous or inherently weak. The CCTV, admissions, arrest comments, interview conduct and medical evidence provided ample evidence on which a jury could convict of murder.
4. The application to add the proposed fresh ground was refused. The statutory filter under section 31 of the Criminal Appeal Act 1968 is important, and fresh grounds require particularly cogent justification: R v James [2018] EWCA Crim 285; [2018] 1 WLR 2749. Under section 23 of that Act, the medical records were capable of belief and might provide general support, but were too remote and unlikely to have affected the safety of the conviction. The trial counsel’s decision to exclude them to avoid damaging bad-character material was a legitimate tactical choice within the range of reasonable professional judgment, consistent with McCook.
5. Sentence. The renewed application for leave to appeal sentence was refused. Under Schedule 21 to the Sentencing Act 2020, the court must select an appropriate starting point and adjust it for aggravating and mitigating features in a fact-specific exercise. The trial judge was entitled to find an intention to kill at the second strike, treat the vehicle as a weapon equivalent, and take account of intoxication, vulnerability, repeated hostile driving and suffering. Schedule 21 contains no threshold requiring suffering to be significant before it can aggravate sentence. The 18-year minimum term was neither wrong in principle nor arguably manifestly excessive. The sentence was directed to be recorded as life imprisonment with a minimum term of 16 years and 114 days.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): the renewed applications for leave to appeal conviction and sentence were refused. The court directed that the minimum term be recorded as 16 years and 114 days after deducting 616 days spent on remand.
• Chester Crown Court: following conviction for murder, the applicant received life imprisonment with a minimum term of 18 years, less time spent on remand.
• Single judge: refused leave to appeal, leading to the renewed applications.