R v Youssef Wahid

Good behaviour in prison does not, by itself, justify reducing a life sentence’s minimum term on appeal. It is a matter for the Parole Board when release is considered after the minimum term. The Court of Appeal may interfere with sentence only where it is manifestly excessive or wrong in principle or law. A life sentence permitting parole after the minimum term is not, on the material presented, an arguable breach of Article 8. An unexplained and exceptionally lengthy delay is an additional reason to refuse an extension of time.

The applicant was convicted of murder at the Central Criminal Court on 22 August 2011 and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 24 years, less time spent on remand. His application for leave to appeal against conviction had previously been refused by the Full Court: [2012] EWCA Crim 2691.

He renewed an application, refused by a Single Judge, for an extension of 4,658 days to seek leave to appeal against sentence. He relied on good behaviour in prison and alleged that the length of the sentence adversely affected his Article 8 rights.

1. The application for an extension of time and leave to appeal against sentence was refused. The Court agreed with the Single Judge’s reasons and added nothing.
2. The threshold for appellate intervention was that the sentence must be manifestly excessive or otherwise wrong in principle or law. That threshold was not arguably met.
3. Good behaviour in prison was commendable, but it was not a ground of appeal against the minimum term. It could be taken into account by the Parole Board when considering release after the minimum term had been served.
4. The sentencing judge had already considered the applicant’s mitigation and previous good character. The minimum term was therefore not arguably excessive or wrong in principle or law, particularly in light of the aggravating features identified by the Single Judge.
5. The Article 8 argument was wholly without merit. A life sentence allowing parole to be sought after service of the minimum term was not arguably incompatible with the applicant’s human rights.
6. The application was more than ten years late, and no sensible reason for the delay had been given. That delay alone would have been sufficient to refuse the application.

• Central Criminal Court: on 22 August 2011, the applicant was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 24 years less time served on remand.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): the Full Court refused leave to appeal against conviction, in the decision cited as [2012] EWCA Crim 2691.
• Single Judge: refused the applicant’s applications concerning leave to appeal against sentence and the extension of time.
• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): refused the renewed application for an extension of time.