R v Neil Patrick McEvoy

A guilty plea does not automatically prevent an appeal against conviction, but a voluntary plea is ordinarily difficult to overturn. A plea may be set aside where it was compelled by improper pressure, resulted from incorrect legal advice that deprived the defendant of a probably successful defence and caused clear injustice, or falls within the residual category of a false plea where the defendant did not commit the offence.

Over-optimistic advice about sentence length does not ordinarily vitiate a plea. A very lengthy and inadequately explained delay may justify refusing an extension of time. The absence of DNA evidence does not by itself make a conviction unsafe where the circumstances provide a satisfactory explanation for its absence.

The applicant pleaded guilty at the Crown Court at Preston to rape and other offences. He was sentenced on 25 January 2023 to an extended sentence of 20 years for rape, with concurrent sentences for the other offences. His appeal against sentence was refused on 19 May 2023.

He later sought an extension of 590 days and leave to appeal against the rape conviction. He alleged that counsel had induced his guilty plea by promising a lower sentence, that DNA testing produced no incriminating result, and that his representation had been inadequate. The central issues were whether the delay should be extended and whether any of those matters created an arguable basis for setting aside the guilty plea.

The renewed application was refused. The court declined to extend time and held that none of the proposed grounds of appeal was arguable.

1. Extension of time. The applicant had been represented at trial and had appealed against sentence in time. His only explanation for the 590-day delay was an unsupported assertion that he had asked his solicitors to obtain alternative advice. That did not adequately explain the delay.
2. Effect of the guilty plea. A guilty plea does not absolutely bar an appeal against conviction, but the court should be cautious before overturning a voluntary plea. As explained in R v Asiedu [2014] EWCA Crim 567, a formal admission in open court will ordinarily be difficult to undo. The plea was unequivocal, voluntary and made after the applicant had time to consider the Crown’s case and the substantial sentence he faced.
3. Recognised categories. The categories in which a guilty plea may be set aside were summarised in Tredget [2022] EWCA Crim 108. They include pleas compelled by improper pressure, pleas vitiated by incorrect legal advice which deprived the defendant of a probably successful defence and caused clear injustice, and the small residual category where the defendant did not commit the offence. The present case fell within none of them.
4. Advice about sentence. Over-optimistic advice about sentence length was not improper pressure and was not incorrect legal advice of the type capable of vitiating a plea. The advice contained no unconditional promise. Saik [2004] EWCA Crim 2396 confirmed that erroneous advice about sentence and confiscation did not invalidate a guilty plea.
5. Evidence and representation. The absence of DNA was not significant because the prosecution case did not involve ejaculation in or on the complainant, and DNA would not necessarily have transferred to the hammer. The evidence against the applicant was strong. Counsel’s recommendation that he consider pleading guilty was sensible, and the decision not to proceed to trial was the applicant’s voluntary choice.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): renewed application for an extension of 590 days and leave to appeal against conviction refused.
• Crown Court at Preston: applicant pleaded guilty to rape and other offences and was sentenced on 25 January 2023. An appeal against sentence was refused by the full court on 19 May 2023.