R v Paul Anthony Amoah

Under section 360 of the Sentencing Act 2020, a court dealing with an offender for any offence may impose a restraining order to protect victims or others from harassment or fear of violence. No conviction for a course of conduct is required. There is no further statutory test, but restrictions must be clear, necessary and proportionate, supported by evidence that future harmful conduct is at least likely. Serious violence alone is insufficient; the surrounding context matters. Victim views need not always be obtained separately where the existing evidence enables the court to infer them. A lengthy sentence or prospective licence conditions does not necessarily make an order unnecessary. Orders may prohibit direct or indirect contact, including from custody, and may restrict attendance at places where victims live or work.

The appellant was convicted at the Crown Court at Truro of attempted murder, wounding with intent and aggravated burglary, and received a 27-year sentence. The sentencing judge also imposed restraining orders protecting three victims. With limited leave, the appellant challenged only those orders. He argued that the statutory power required a future course of conduct amounting to harassment or causing fear of violence, that the orders were unnecessary given his sentence and likely licence conditions, and that the victims’ views should have been obtained. The appeal concerned the scope of the current statutory power, the evidential basis required for necessity, the relevance of victim views, and the clarity, proportionality and duration of the orders.

The appeal was dismissed.

1. Statutory power. The former power under section 5 of the Protection from Harassment Act 1997 was materially altered by later amendments. The current power under section 360 of the Sentencing Act 2020 may be exercised when the court is dealing with an offender for any offence. It is not confined to offences under sections 2 or 4 of the 1997 Act, and it does not require conviction for a course of conduct or proof of a future course of conduct.
2. Necessity and evidence. Although section 360 contains no further statutory test, every prohibition must be clear, necessary and proportionate for the statutory purpose. Consistently with R v Ross [2020] RTR 19, necessity requires an evidential basis making it at least likely that the offender will engage in conduct amounting to harassment or causing fear of violence. The court distinguished Ross. Here the attack was planned and targeted, committed in the context of other criminality, and the appellant had extensive convictions including violence, threats, breaches of court orders and witness intimidation. Serious violence alone would not justify an order in every case, but the surrounding evidence was sufficient.
3. Victim views. The court need not always obtain separate evidence from the protected person. Victim views may be important, and sometimes determinative, particularly in familial cases. Here the judge had victim personal statements from two victims and had heard the trial evidence, providing ample material from which to infer their views.
4. Terms and duration. The orders were clear, limited and proportionate. Direct or indirect contact could be made from prison as well as after release. The lengthy sentence and possible licence conditions did not eliminate the need for protection, since licence terms were speculative and the orders operated during custody and after release. Restrictions on attending places where victims were believed to live or work were also proportionate. An order without limit of time was permissible.
5. Sentencing observation. The court observed that, because dangerousness was a significant issue, a pre-sentence report should have been ordered, referring to Rex v Thompson [2025] EWCA Crim 1462. That observation did not affect dismissal of the appeal.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): dismissed the appeal against the restraining orders.
• Crown Court at Truro: convicted the appellant of attempted murder, wounding with intent and aggravated burglary, sentenced him to 27 years’ imprisonment, and imposed restraining orders protecting the victims.