R v Adrian Richard Rycroft

Where a juror discloses personal experience of sexual abuse, the trial judge should inquire whether the juror can remain loyal to the juror’s oath and decide the case solely on the evidence. If the juror confirms that ability, continued service may be a reasonable and proportionate course.

A renewed application for permission to appeal must identify an arguable error or matter capable of affecting the safety of the conviction. Fresh material with little bearing on the charges, unsupported criticisms of trial representation, and alleged irregularities incapable of making a material difference do not provide a proper basis for leave.

The applicant was convicted at the Crown Court at Leeds of ten sexual offences against two young girls. On 27 September 2024, he received a 23-year special custodial sentence for an offender of particular concern, comprising 22 years’ custody and a one-year licence period, under section 278 of the Sentencing Act 2020.

After a single judge refused permission to appeal, the applicant renewed his application. He alleged error in retaining a juror who disclosed historic sexual abuse, ineffective representation, fresh evidence concerning contact between the complainants’ mothers, misleading prosecution evidence and submissions, and inadequate disclosure.

The central issue was whether any ground disclosed an arguable error of law, unfairness, or material irregularity capable of justifying permission to appeal.

1. The renewed application for permission to appeal was refused. The court endorsed the single judge’s reasons and held that none of the grounds disclosed an arguable basis for leave.
2. On the juror issue, the trial judge was right not to treat the juror’s initial statement as determinative. The judge made the proper inquiry: whether the juror could remain loyal to the oath and try the case on the evidence. The juror confirmed that he could do so. The decision to permit him to continue was reasonable and proportionate, and disclosed no arguable error.
3. The proposed fresh evidence from the applicant’s mother gave no proper basis for admission on appeal. It could have been available at trial, had little bearing on the merits of the charges, and did not materially advance the suggested case that the complainants’ mothers had communicated.
4. The allegations of deficient representation were unsupported. Trial counsel’s account showed careful preparation and presentation of the defence, and the summing-up reflected the evidential conflicts addressed in cross-examination. The prosecution closing contained no concession that there was no evidence against the applicant; it advanced a case for conviction on all counts.
5. The complaint about screenshots could not have made a material difference, since they did not feature in the judge’s careful summing-up in a way capable of affecting the merits. The disclosure complaint was unsupported by evidence that prosecution disclosure was incomplete or that further disclosure was required in the interests of justice.
6. The prosecution case was strong and supported by substantial evidence. The convictions disclosed no proper suggestion of legal error in the trial process.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): refused the renewed application for permission to appeal against conviction.
• Crown Court at Leeds: convicted the applicant on 25 January 2024 of ten sexual offences and, on 27 September 2024, imposed a 23-year special custodial sentence, together with a restraining order and a sexual harm prevention order.